Modern Confucianism

    A good post over at Granite Studio by Jeremiah brings up a question I have posed here before: How modern can Confucius be?  Jeremiah is responding to a talk given by Daniel A. Bell, a philosophy professor at Qinghua.  Bell works seriously on what Confucianism can mean politically today.  One of the key issues is: can Confucianism provide a political-theoretical foundation for an alternative to Western liberal democracy?  Bell probes this issue by drawing out the communitarian elements of Confucian thought.  Jeremiah has some questions:

Finally, I felt as if Professor Bell, in his desire to counteract more extreme criticisms of China from Europe and North America, has set up a bit of a straw man. Yes, there are those in the United States who see American-style liberal democracy as a franchise suitable for all places and peoples, but most of the writers and researchers on China that I know do not fall into this category. Certainly I don’t. As I’ve said numerous times, I feel that there are certain reforms (free media, free speech, free religion, the right to assembly, and judicial independence) that would help consolidate and enhance the reforms already underway in China. But I fear Professor Bell may have, as the saying goes, ‘leaned too far to one side’ when he suggested on Tuesday that legal rights are not necessarily a primary prerequisite of development. His admonition that courts and legal proceedings are inferior to mediation and other more ‘civil’ means of solving disputes is both noble and certainly in keeping with the Analects and the Late Imperial tradition of Confucian Statecraft, but preferring to solve things through mediation does not obviate the need for legal safeguards to protect the rights of the people.

     This helps focus the question.  We can ask: does a politically modernized Confucianism have to accept fully institutionalized legal protections of individual rights?  You'll notice that I have smuggled the term "individual" into Jeremiah's formulation, but I think that is in keeping with the general thrust of his comments (correct me if I am wrong, Jeremiah).

      To push the conversation along, let me cut right to the point.  I will argue here (and I am open to persuasive counterarguments) that, to be relevant in a modern political context, Confucianism must recognize and embrace the notion of individual rights. I say this because the inherent dynamics of modernization press in this direction.  History, of course, does not move smoothly and unidirectionally.  Human agency of various forms can have real and lasting effects.  But if we look at Chinese history since, say, 1900, it seems fairly clear that, over the arc of that time, the idea of individuals endowed with inalienable rights, has become stronger.  I am influenced in this view by Merle Goldman's book, From Comrade to Citizen; and Kevin O'Brien and Li Lianjiang's book, Rightful Resistance in Rural China.

     It should be noted that Elizabeth Perry (warning, pdf file), among others, has pushed against these writers and argued that the Chinese notion of rights is different than the Western notion of rights:

...the meaning of “rights” in Chinese political discourse differs significantly from the Anglo-American tradition. Viewed in historical context, China’s contemporary “rights” protests seem less politically threatening.

    She has a point.  But even with that important caveat, I think the general point still stands: China has become more rights conscious in recent decades, and that consciousness in creating a more individualistic culture. 

      We can take the point a step further.  Individual rights consciousness in China has arisen not only from domestic sources of economic and political reform, but also from global cultural flows.  Globalization does not promote only cultural individualism, but its encouragement of cultural individualism is powerful.  

      Long story short: Chinese culture today - while not simply a clone of American culture - is more individualized than ever before in its history (I'll let the historians assess that statement!), and it exists in a global context that creates powerful obstacles against a return to anything like traditional communitarianism (I loved Jeremiah's quote from Jaroslav Pelikan: ”Tradition is the living faith of the dead, Traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.”)

       If all that is true - and I admit it is all debatable - then it would seem that any Confucian revival, if it is to be relevant to modern Chinese people or modern people anywhere, must compromise with the pervasive cultural, and increasingly political, individualism that exists in the world today.

      This is not to say that Chinese politics will inevitably look like American politics.  There are many ways in which individual rights can be legally protected in varying cultural contexts.  But it is to argue that, whatever Chinese politics becomes, it will hold within it more recognition and protection of individual rights than was the case in either imperial or Maoist times.  Will such an individualized and modernized Confucianism still be fundamentally Confucian?  I think it can be.  I think, in some ways, that is what Yu Dan is producing.  

    What a modern Confucianism can do, it seems to me, is not create a fundamental political alternative to individual-rights-based politics but, rather, to provide a critique of how we can understand what an "individual " is.  Confucianism highlights the social and moral embeddedness of individuals, and that is important to keep in mind.  But, even with that understanding, a modern Confucianism will be politically irrelevant if it cannot embrace the legal and political defense of individual rights.

Comments

[Justsomeguy]

The problem, of course, is that crass individualism results in precisely the sort of anomie that plagues the modern West and when someone advocates Confucianism as a modern political ideology, it is to address this problem.

It is decidedly communitarian and I'm not sure that a notion of individual rights is required or even desirable.

[Chris]

The "compromise" might wind up not to get you a theory of individual rights, but rather a body of laws or traditions or institutional practices that de facto protect what we would call individual rights -- a protection that would stem theoretically not from a defense of individual autonomy, but rather harmony. For example, it may be the case that group harmony is actually best achieved when individuals are allowed to speak their minds (and so on).

[Zoomzan]

First, we must understand that there are many different interpretations of the Classics. Some of these are decidedly libertarian.

What we must understand, furthermore, is that libertarianism is not libertinism. It is a great misconception that libertarians reject community and embrace individualism.

It is in fact the opposite. Man is a social animal. In all societies, a man must be related to some social institution or another. When the coercive state becomes too powerful, it will try to co-opt all human relations into itself. When it does this, it destroys communal ties which bind man to man.

When the state is limited by constitutions, privileges, and rights, then social relations is restored to the spontaneous community. Social mores are enforced more through societal disapproval and at worse ostracism than through violent punishments.

We can study this from many angles. But the simplest example is education. In the past, the community educated its children. Today, the state educates the children. Thus we see the contrast. Whereas in the past, children grow up to love their community, and they are well-versed in the traditions of their community, today the state, by co-opting human relations, produce atomicised and disaffected individuals.

Therefore, freedom is the true path to community.

Of course, I'm writing all of this in simple terms. To make a compelling argument, we must adapt our rhetorics to specifically Chinese conditions.

[Justsomeguy]

I challenge the notion that the Five Classics can be viewed in a libertarian manner. I don't think the Four Books can either. Some of the Daozang can, but even then I think it is something of a stretch since even the most liberatrian-seeming sections were directed towards autocratic rulers with the hope that they adopt them.

Could you provide some examples while elaborating on the intent? I don't think it can be done without maintaining intent. Not to be a dick, I just don't see it.

[Zoomzan]

I'm a poor student of the Classics. Therefore, I should refrain from exertion, which only provide amusement to better people.

But let me provide a link.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/snyder-joshua/snyder-joshua10.html

There are more such links, but I'll have to search amongst my papers.

Another thing - I think reading with intent is perfectly legitimate. Certainly, Sun Yat-Sen regularly quoted the Classics in his lectures on democracy and constitutionalism. So far as I know, Confucius did not directly mention either.

In the West, the basic division between theology and religious studies is that the former presupposes intent. I therefore quite approve of reading with intent.

[Zoomzan]

Actually, to read the Classics meaningfully already presupposes intent. By "meaningfully," I mean that the Classics are a reliable guide to the world, that they make certain demands upon a man desirous of the best life, and that they require some sort of faith. Otherwise, the Classics are simply a collection of disjunct historical data. Maybe entertaining, or even enlightening - but ultimately no better than an evening with Cicero.

You have to believe that the Classics are qualitatively different from mundane texts. This in turn presupposes a theory of inspiration.

You have to believe that the Classics form a coherent whole. This in turns presupposes much philosophy.

[Sam]

Thanks for the comments, everyone. They are helping me continue thinking about this. Here are some reactions:
- yes, there are also limitations on individualism. Extreme selfishness and hedonism can lead to immorality. Perhaps Confucianism can help us avoid those kinds of improprieties. But that sort of correction still must happen within the context of secured individual rights (and by that I mean a certain minimum recognition of personal security and freedom). We constantly restrict individual actions in the interest of community standards (think of traffic laws for instance, or speech restrictions), but we do so while simultaneously protecting a basic framework of personal rights. That is the context within which a modern Confucianism must, I believe, operate.
- I'm not, at this point, looking for a Confucian-theoretical defense of individual rights. Rather, I am suggesting that the modern application of Confucian thought must operate on the assumption of protected individual rights. Chris's formulation is helpful in this regard: for my purposes the pragmatic acceptance (as opposed to the theoretical justification) of certain individual rights is sufficient.
- regarding how we read the classics, my concern of late has been to ask how the classics might be understood and applied today. The question of what the classics meant in their own time is a very different matter. Of course, ancient meanings will not be the same as modern meanings. That does not mean, I believe, that our modern applications are false; they simply operate in a different discursive and cultural context. Indeed, whether we like it or not, the classic texts do have and will have meaning in a contemporary context. As long as the texts themselves exist, they will produce meanings the reflect the moment in which they are read. I think it is always useful to debate how our contemporary understandings vary from traditional readings (to the extent that we can reconstruct the latter), but that does not necessarily invalidate modern interpretations that differ from traditional notions.

[Gary Jin]

The entry on "Individual Rights" on Wikipedia says:

"Individual rights refer to the rights of the individual, distinct from civil rights, legal rights, and group rights... individual rights identify a boundary of just social interactions, in the presence or absence of government... individual rights are assumed prior to government. Individual rights are often codified into law so that they may be protected by impartial third parties such as the government."

I don't know about you all, but that sounds an awful lot like Confucianism to me. At its core, Confucianism also delimits the boundaries of social interaction in both the absence and presence of government. That individual rights are assumed to exist before government also echoes the internalization of ritual influences versus the external force of laws. (Analects, 2.3)

I'd say not only must Confucianism embrace and recognize individual rights to remain relevant, but Confucianism must do so to even exist as it should.

[Chris]

Gary,

The problem is, though -- Confucianism presents no theoretical basis for talking about autonomous individual agents, and it seems you need those first before you can talk in a theoretical way about individual rights.

I take 2.3 not to be a concern about individual rights as opposed to the state, but rather a concern that virtue cannot flourish is behavior is motivated strictly by coercion via legal frameworks.

I think what we'd want is a notion of relational or group oriented rights that winds up, de facto, providing practices that support individual rights. That said, as I noted above, I do not think you can squeeze much more out of Confucius.

I should note too that Henry Rosemont (Confucian scholar) has (to me anyway) convincingly argued that first generation rights (of the type typically attributed to individuals -- free speech, free association, rights to property, etc) do not extend naturally to second-generation rights (rights to housing, rights to education, etc). But, there is and can be a natural extension from second-generation to first generation, making -- in his opinion -- the latter type preferable.

[Zoomzan]

I strongly disagree with "second-generation" rights. It's these "rights" which allow governments to expand infinitely.

But that's just my view.

[Gary]

Chris,

I'd have to disagree with you and Rosemont, on the basis that once you start getting into the generations of human rights you have already assumed the primacy of government in determining rights. However, individual rights already exist prior to government, unlike civil or group rights; it's because "human rights" lump civil rights together with individual rights that it assumes its natural existence. The extension of second generation rights back is, to me, overthinking the problem, as it's basically arguing for a government validation of a government validation of naturally occurring rights.

I'd suggest when we read 2.3 (and Confucius in general) as a politically philosophical text, we have to focus on what it's trying to DO and get away from the mumbo-jumbo on virtue, etc.; to be preoccupied by it strays into a religious reading of the text (nothing wrong with it, but not what we're trying to do), and the action of the text gets lost. In this case, we could, and I believe should, take that nebulous term, virtue, out of the picture (I's argue when Confucius says you have to know WHY you're doing something, otherwise it's meaningless, it's also self-referential), and focus on the action of the passage; the action of 2.3 is a critique of external forces versus internal ones. With external forces, people don't know why they're doing something, but they will with internal forces. With internal forces at work, between will not only do right thing, but will become good through it.

In 2.3, the internal forces are shame, not just individual shame, but shame brought about from being a substandard member of society. If we wished to factor in talk of individual rights, they give us a reason and mechanism for shame by delimiting the interactions of society. Ritual and Duty seem, to me, to be but different words for the same mechanism.

[Chris]

Gary,

I'm not saying that second-generation rights are the right way to go -- I'm just suggesting that if you want to squeeze rights out of Confucius, that's probably about the best you'll get, given that obligation is towards relations, not individuals. There are no pre-relational individuals in Confucianism as far as I can see, nor does the text seem in any way to be concerned with modern notions of "rights."

On 2.3, first, I don't take virtue to be mumbo-jumbo, nor to be of secondary importance to the text, to be quite honest. The book seems to be concerned with the discussion about how to live a good life, which is central to philosophical treatments of virtue. Second, I certainly don't disagree that your internal/external distinction is relevant to 2.3. I think you are right. However, that very distinction is central _to_ a reading of the passage as concerned with virtue driven vs coercion driven behavior (the latter being pointless to Confucius). So I guess I'm not seeing the disagreement here. All I'm suggesting is that the main meat of 2.3 is not a concern with "the individual vs the state."

I'm not exactly sure what you mean in your last point -- if you mean that we can use shame to delimit the actions of persons to get a set of practices that guarantee a de facto set of individual rights, I'm not in disagreement with you. However, as I see it, in Confucianism shame would be generated from the starting point of one's immersion within relational frameworks, not from the standpoint of recognizing the existence of autonomous atomic agents.

[Zoomzan]

For me, the defense of tradition is in itself a defense against arbitrary government. A modern formulation of individual rights is less important.

For instance, a parent should have extensive control over his/her offspring's activities. This would be against the modern formulation of individual rights, but it is a potent defense against government interference.

The same applies to any human relationship defined in the Classics.

On a larger scale, there are, of course, many passages about decentralised authority and federalism in the Classics. I'm not an expert, so I will continue no further.