In one of my various other lives, I teach international politics. My current senior seminar, entitled "Globalization and War," is considering how the economic, technological, cultural and political transformations characterized as "globalization" (a fairly sprawling and thus vague term) influence the nature of conflict around the world and the conduct of war.
We have just finished reading Thomas X. Hammes book, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. It makes for a good conversation about globalization and conflict but it also has some obvious resonances with Sun Tzu, the great ancient Chinese military strategist. I am sure Hammes could have made the obvious connections - he is a retired Marine Corps officer, and it is impossible to move through any of the service academies or war colleges without encountering Sun Tzu - but he did not. So I will.
For Hammes the most important form of warfare today is "fourth generation war," a development and variation on insurgency. He traces its roots back to Mao, and the guerrilla strategy of the Chinese revolution, and draws a clear line of development through Vietnam, the Sandinistas, the Palestinian intifada, al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq. A couple of the key characteristics of fourth generation war are: 1) the paramountcy of the political goal; 2) the use of all means - military, political,economic, media - to influence the adversaries will regarding the paramount political goal; 3) the reliance of flexible, small scale, politically targeted military tactics; 4) patience in realizing that political goals are not secured only in battlefield victories (indeed, battlefield losses can become political victories) but evolve over the course of many years.
Fourth generation war is to be distinguished from third generation war in that the latter relies upon large-scale conventional, highly mobile, high-tech armaments. Think WWII, or the rush to Baghdad in the current Iraq war.
Hammes argues that such third generation encounters are less likely and less threatening under conditions of globalization, because technological and economic developments favor fourth generation war-fighting capabilities. Briefly, these include the greater flexibility and effectiveness of networks as opposed to hierarchies in global competitions of all sorts. Networks, with flatter organizational structures and faster absorption of information, can adapt and respond to changing circumstances compared to cumbersome and slow bureaucratic hierarchies (think early Apple v. IBM). And this matters for war-fighting and the achievement political goals through the use of violence.
I won't explicate the text any further. As they say: read the whole thing. Rather, I want to turn this toward Sun Tzu.
Hammes points out that Maoist guerrilla tactics are especially well suited to 21st century, networked, fourth generation war. It is all about flexibly responding to the adversaries condition in pursuit of political goals. The famous Maoist dictum goes something like this:
When the enemy advances, we retreat
When the enemy rests, we harass
When the enemy tires, we attack
When the enemy withdraws, we pursue.
Classic guerrilla tactics that are obviously being used by Taliban remnants (revivalists?) in Afghanistan, the Iraqi insurgency, and al-Qaeda. They do not frontally attack US military power, but work around the margins, picking the time and location of their assaults to make the political point that they are still functioning and effective.
Mao was obviously influenced by Sun Tzu, whom he read, and especially the following passages:
All warfare is based on deception.
Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active,
inactivity.
When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far
away, that you are near.
Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike
him.
When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is
strong, avoid him. (Griffin, 66-67)
There is another important connection between Hammes's fourth generation warfare and Sun Tzu: the importance of the political goal. Hammes argues that conflicts like the current Iraqi insurgency (which he believes we should have seen coming and should have prepared for more effectively) are all about politics. They do not need to win on the battlefield but just not lose, to stay in the fight to draw attention to the American occupation and inflame the public against the US and the current government. At times the US plays right into this strategy by emphasizing military responses over political perceptions. The recent bombing of Ramadi, for example, does not advance US political goals in Iraq. Military force has to be disciplined more tightly to shape the political context. In this sense, we should not respond to the enemy's tactics, but try to undermine his strategy. Which is just what Sun Tzu said:
For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
Thus what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.
It may be too late to win without fighting in Iraq, but we can certainly fight smarter but recognizing the fourth generation warfare significance of attacking the enemy's strategy.
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