China to 'strike hard' against rising unrest
BEIJING (Reuters) - China is preparing to "strike hard" against rising public unrest, a senior police official said according to state media on Thursday, highlighting the government's fears for stability even as the economy booms.
An unnamed top official of China's Ministry of Public Security told a Wednesday meeting that China faced a long period of dangerous social discontent, Xinhua news agency said.
....Last week, China's Ministry of Public Security put the total number of "mass incidents" -- riots, demonstrations and smaller protests -- at a total 87,000 last year, up 6.6 percent from 2004.
The latest unusually grim police diagnosis of China's social strains comes less than a week after Premier Wen Jiabao was reported as warning that corrupt land seizures in the countryside were stoking protests and riots.
On the other hand, we have this story in today's People's Daily:
Chinese President calls for intensified efforts to boost rural development
Chinese President Hu Jintao on Thursday urged governments at all levels to invest more and work harder for a leap forward in agricultural modernization and breakthroughs in building a new relationship between industry and agriculture and between urban and rural areas.
....Hu urged Party and government officials across the country to go to the grassroots level to listen to farmers' ideas and proposals, and set development targets and measures according to the local conditions, with emphasis placed on the fundamental interests of the rural population.
Party organizations and government departments should make concerted efforts to mobilize the initiative of farmers and the general public for the building of a new socialist countryside.
Which will it be? Will the CCP be more repressive toward farmers or more conciliatory. Can we expect more incidents like Dongzhou? Or will the regime find a way of peacefully engaging and diffusing rural discontent? Of course, both things could happen at the same time. So, the bottom-line question is: which trend will be more prevalent, repression or compromise?
This is what I asked the I Ching today. And the answer it gave me was fairly optimistic: the CCP leadership should work more toward conciliation and rely less on active repression.
UPDATE: This Saturday Washington Post piece seems to confirm Friday's I Ching reading. Let's hope so.
UPDATE II: The Peking Duck also hopes its true this time.
The oracle produced Hexagram 39, "Obstruction" (or "Adversity), with no moving lines:
We have encountered this hexagram before, when asking about the future of Middle East politics. There, it seemed like a pessimistic augury, suggesting a difficult-to-resolve situation. But, with this question, it seems more optimistic.
"Obstruction" does, indeed, present a rather bleak condition:
The hexagram pictures a dangerous abyss lying before us and a steep, inaccessible mountain rising behind us. We are surrounded by obstacles...
But, it also tells us how to respond:
...at the same time, since the mountain has the attribute of keeping still, there is implicit a hint as to how we can extricate ourselves. The hexagram represents obstructions that appear in the course of time but that can and should be overcome.
The best approach here is to not act precipitously: "In
such a situation it is wise to pause in view of the danger and to retreat." Thus, if we think of President Hu and Prime Minister Wen, caught between the equally difficult paths of repression (which could undermine regime legitimacy) and compromise (which they might fear will make the government appear too weak, inspiring more protests), the I Ching is advising "retreat." This is not a call to active and violent suppression. Rather, it is saying that the seemingly "weak" option of "retreat" will yield better results in the long term.
The hexagram is also telling Hu and Wen not to cast all blame on lower level officials:
Difficulties and obstructions throw a man back upon himself. While the inferior man seeks to put the blame on other persons, bewailing his fate, the superior man seeks the error within himself, and through this introspection the external obstacle becomes for him an occasion for inner enrichment and education.
The central leadership needs to assume responsibility for the dire situation in many rural areas. Indeed, the high level of centralization of political power in China would, at least in theory, make it possible for Hu and Wen to demand "retreat" at the lower levels, to allow for more time to respond to particular problems.
Of course, the I Ching is suggesting what the best course of action should be, "best" here defined as yielding the most positive results in the longer term. This could work against the short term interests of the CCP, requiring that local cadres give up their power to control land and businesses. The oracle, however, does not care about the political interests of rulers; it values more the common interests of society at large in the belief that if most people are content, political rulers will be safe in their positions. To maintain its legitimacy, the Party may have to cede some power.
And, finally, Hu and Wen could chose to do the wrong thing. They could run down the "strike hard" path. If they do, the I Ching tells us, both the country and their own political fortunes will likely be worse off.
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