Today we have what appears to be a significant victory against global terrorist networks: the arrest of a ring of people in Britain who were preparing to blow up airplanes. It is noteworthy that this was the result of good police work:
London's Deputy Police Commissioner, Paul Stephenson, said 21 people had been arrested in London, southeastern England and Birmingham, England's second-largest city, after a months-long investigation into what he said was a plan for "mass murder on an unimaginable scale."
Peter Clarke, chief of the London police department's anti-terrorism branch, said the investigation reached a "critical point" Wednesday night, requiring immediate disruption of the plot, the arrests and the imposition of heightened security measures.
Bravo for them. What this demonstrates is the subtlety of the "war" on terrorism. It is something more complex and fluid than your
standard notion of conventional war, with one army facing off against
the other on a clearly defined battlefield. It requires a sophisticate coordination of all available means of resistance - and that means it is as much a police-investigative effort as a military effort, a point that neo-con war hawks have long derided.
The hyper-militarized US disaster in Iraq stands in stark contrast to the pain-staking
police work of the British investigators. We are squandering enormous
resources in a hapless effort to avoid Bush's complete embarrassment,
while contributing, politically, to the reproduction of al-Qaeda's
strategy. And the same can be said for the Israel-Hezbollah war: it
simply plays into the narrative created by bin Laden, et al. If we were smart, we would do everything in our power to impose a cease-fire.
As regards the broader effort against al-Qaeda, what is needed is a more focused strategy that targets specifically the people who are trying to pull off the terrorist spectacles and that attends to the larger political-media battle of images and ideas. Strategy and tactics must be tailored to the circumstances surrounding the necessity of war. Sun Tzu (Sun Zi) gets at this idea here:
The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can they wise lay plans against you.
It is according to shapes that I lay the plans for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands the way in which I have created victory.
Therefore, when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.
Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strengths and strikes weaknesses.
And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.
And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.
Thus, one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.
We must understand the form of the enemy and shape our responses accordingly. Division-sized invasions are less relevant than stealthy surveillance and careful targeting of specific individuals.
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