Korean Confucian Abortion

     So here I am this morning in the office, getting ready to plug in my memory key and upload the book chapter I am working on (this is chapter three, which discusses abortion, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell research from modern Confucian and Taoist points of view.  It is chapter three overall.  Chapter two, the brief introduction to key concepts of Confucianism and Taoism is done.  Chapter one, the introduction to the book as a whole has not yet been started), when, lo and behold, I hit upon a post at the Western Confucian that speaks directly to what I wrote yesterday.     He quotes from a JoongAng Daily article reporting on a decision by the South Korean Supreme Court:

Is an unborn child a human being or not?
Korea’s highest court ruled yesterday that an unborn child cannot be considered human until the moment the mother goes into labor, thus clearing a midwife of negligent homicide charges.

...

“It was a very difficult decision,” said Judge Park Si-hwan, who presided over the trial, adding that he had reviewed similar cases at home and overseas as a reference.
“Right now, it is too early to change Korea’s legal point of view that an unborn child is not a human being.” 
Yesterday’s verdict is in line with court precedents in 1982 and 1998, in which an unborn child was ruled to be a person only after labor begins.

 I am not sure what the judge means when he says it is "too early" to change the law.  Perhaps he is open to a redefinition of the legal standard of when life begins but there needs to be other legislative work to be done first.

      In any event, however much this ruling might outrage abortion opponents, not just in Korea but world-wide, I believe that it is consistent with a modern application of Confucian principles.  And maybe that is why it is legally, and I assume also socially, acceptable in Korea.

     For Confucius human life is something more than biology.  We gain our humanity through social interactions, by fulfilling our duties in a careful and consistent manner.  If we accept "Humanity" as a definition of human person-hood, then a fetus cannot yet be human until it has been drawn into social relationships.  The actual moment of birth, defined by the Korean judges as "labor," is a sensible starting point for the social processes that make us human.   This seems to be the assumption in Confucian-influenced Japan, as well as in non-Confucian (at least by history and culture - maybe they are Confucian without knowing it!) Germany:

In Japan, a baby is considered a human being when a part of the baby emerges from the mother’s body.   Germany applies the same legal standard as Korea.

       The actual moment of physical birth is not, however, a perfect marker of the beginning of social relationships that might, in a Confucian sense, humanize the fetus.  The expectation of the baby-to-be can create social behaviors and identities that function as forums for the enactment of Humanity-creating duties.  Social life, in other words, can begin before physical birth. 

       But Confucianism is not absolute on this point, either.  Pre-birth social interactions are a function of parental involvement and acceptance of the fetus as an imminent child.   If parents do not initiate social relationships with the fetus, then the humanizing process has not really begun and the fetus would not be considered "human."

      This is not quite what the Korean court ruled, but it comes close.  The court seems to have fashioned an absolute legal standard: human person-hood begins at labor.  I imagine they did this because of the legal confusion that would follow a ruling that held parents, in their affections and attachments, define the beginning of human life.  That sort of standard would require a case by case consideration of parental motivations because not all motivations to reject a fetus would be acceptable to a modern Confucian (if it was, say, a pure matter of selfishness, a Confucian might say an abortion is illegitimate).   But Confucianism does not apply well to modern legal systems precisely because it tends toward a situational ethics: the rightness or wrongness of any particular human action, abortion included, must be judged by the particular circumstances surrounding that specific action.

     There are other qualifications to make (and for that you'll have to read the chapter when it is published!) but, suffice it to say here, the Korean court decision about when life begins is broadly consistent with modern Confucian sensibilities.

Comments

[The Western Confucian]

I'm glad I could be of small help with your book.

[Peter]

You suggest that social life can begin before physical birth, but is it not possible for a Confucian to argue that it requires some time after physical birth for the social bonds and interaction between the baby and its parents/siblings to take place? If this were the case, then a newly born baby could be considered something less than fully human. Could this partly explain practises such as female infanticide/abandonment in China?

[Sam]

Peter,
You are generally right, I think. But my sense is that Confucian ethics eschew rigid doctrines and formulas. Both Confucius and Mencius warn against inflexibly adhering to a single principle. This means that questions of the beginning and life and abortion can be answered only on a case by case basis, taking into account the totality of particular circumstances. That said, I think that a decision to reject a female or disabled child, which certainly occurred ancient China, as well as many other ancient civilizations, and which still happen today, are probably taken very shortly after birth. It is against the law these days to kill a newborn on these grounds but ultrasound and other technologies have led to sex-selection abortions and the like. But to get back to the larger ethical question: I think a modern Confucian position would presume that social life can begin before birth and almost certainly begins at birth; therefore, only under the most extreme circumstances would it be permissible to reject a child after birth. Gender and disability, in and of themselves, would be insufficient grounds for such rejection after birth.
I would go further and say that a modern Confucian would also reject abortion for reasons of gender alone, because girls and women are just as good, if not better, at creating Humanity in the world as men. A desire to carry on a particular family line, it seems to me, should not trump the Humanity-creating capacity of female family members, especially in modern contexts where married women can keep their family name and patrilocal exogamy is less prevalent. Abortion for reasons of disability is more complex, due to the variation disabilities, and will have to be a topic for another post.

[Peter]

I like to think that the Confucian would incline toward your position and say that what I've described above is a distortion of Confucian principles, which no "true Confucian" could approve of. But it's also useful to consider the way ethical systems can be distorted and allow people to convince themselves that they are only bending the rules rather than breaking them. It seems to me that defining humanity as something conferred by others rather than innate, also makes it easier for it to be taken away.

[Sam]

Peter.
Excellent point. There is a danger that Humanity can be taken away (just as rights can be taken away in liberal systems under duress - see Bush Department of Justice...). There is one thing to add to the mix, however. Humanity is not simply conferred by others. A person, through their good, dutiful acts, creates and reproduces Humanity. As long as you are doing your duty, your Humanity cannot be taken away. You may be persecuted or repressed but your essential Humanity will remain intact because of your proper actions.