(Cross posted on China Digital Times)
Before I jump into today’s topic – caste and democracy - let me just note two newspaper stories that
speak to my last China/India comparison. They both deal with the changing role of women in Indian society, which
is, to my mind, a critical social dynamic in the interplay of tradition and
modernity in India:
one in the New York Times and the other in the Washington Post. A nice coincidence to see them.
Now, to the issue at hand: a clear difference between India and China is the historical experience
and persistence of caste in the former, something that was palpable in my
recent travels.
As we moved about from place to place, our main tour guide was quite straightforward and unapologetic about mentioning the caste status of other people we met. He himself was from a prominent Ksatriya (warrior and/or ruler) family, or, more specifically, a Rajput. One of our local guides was Vaisya (merchant, artisan), which he stated was the “number two” caste after the Brahmin (which would be disputed by Ksatriya but which also demonstrates the fluidity of caste hierarchy). We also noticed the matrimonial sections of the newspapers, pages dedicated to young people in search of marriage partners. These services were organized by caste – there would be a section of “Brahmin,” then “Agrawal,” etc. Some announcements said that caste was no bar to a match but the clear sense of the entire operation was that caste mattered very much for many, many people. The message was: you do not want your children (most marriages in many parts of the country are arranged by parents or senior family members) to marry someone from the “wrong” caste.
Nothing like this exists in China. But the question that this difference raises is: does it matter? Or, how does it matter?
It obviously matters when it comes to marriage. In the social sphere more generally – who your friends are, how status is defined and reproduced, what is understood as popular – caste plays a significant role. I suspect it matters more for Dalits, out castes, and others at the bottom of the social hierarchy. They are excluded socially from high caste lives, even if their rights are guaranteed in the constitution and their political interests defended in the political process. But, in India, the social sphere is not wholly governed by political practices. Caste lives on despite political, and increasingly economic, forces that push against it.
As I think about the interplay of caste and democracy, I am
led to a counterintuitive conclusion: while caste obviously violates core the democratic
ideal of equal rights, it may have played a critical role in the successful
consolidation of Indian democracy.
To explain: the Indian independence movement was, at base,
politically conservative. It was not
aimed at fundamental transformation of Indian society but, rather, the removal
of foreign power. Gandhi was a political
genius in forging a mass-based nationalist movement that promised participation
for all levels of Indian society, Dalits included. But when independence was gained, Nehru and
other Congress leaders kept their eye on national modernization, not radical
egalitarian promises. They were
thoroughly democratic in their politics and outlook, as opposed to the Leninists in the Chinese Communist Party, but their brand of democracy was
procedural and conservative, allowing high caste power-brokers to maintain
their social and economic standing in the new order. Caste was rejected in the constitution but
was hard-wired into the political system. Christophe Jaffrelot, in the new book The State of India’s Democracy, explains:
“The Congress leaders came mostly from the intelligentsia…whose caste backgrounds drew generally from the literati castes, which includes Kayasths and, more importantly, Brahmins…These politicians had established close working relationships with traders and industrialists even before independence…These groups were allies against the British and remained allies after 1947…Similarly, Congress politicians initiated some collaboration with the landlords…when they understood that they needed the landlords in order to win elections. These landlords still exerted a strong influence over the peasants, not only because they were their bosses, but also because they lent them money on a regular basis. The authority of these elite groups derived from their socioeconomic domination and from their social status: they were all of the upper castes and therefore commanded symbolic power…” (67-68)
There may be a lesson here for China and the prospects for democracy
there.
India, in the first instance, reminds us that democracy could be possible in China. The argument that China is too undeveloped economically and socially is obviously insufficient, an apology of Party bosses who do not want to yield power. Especially these days, with an expanding economy and dynamic society with high rates of literacy, it is hard to accept a socio-economic denial of Chinese democracy.
The dictatorship of the proletariat (the party is the vanguard, the chairman is the ultimate dictator) will not change. Why should it?
Who would win if the party lost?
Posted by: Peter Ramsey | November 26, 2007 at 05:12 PM