There is a lot of talk these days about how the "surge" in Iraq has worked and that "victory" is at hand. Rubbish. While it is true that the "surge" was one of several elements (the others being internal Iraqi political shifts beyond the control of US policy) that contributed to a reduction in violence, it has not produced a political settlement. And without a political settlement, Iraq remains a lost war.
I was reminded of Bush's fundamental failure in Iraq when I heard this morning of the flight of Iraqi Christians from Mosul. From yesterday's NYT:
Violence has continued in the area despite months of concerted effort by American forces and the Iraqi government to root out violent actors there.
I've noticed more reports of violence in recent weeks. It is not at all clear that the reduction in the number of attacks associated with the "surge" will last.
My friend, Abu Aardvark, tells us that political reconciliation has not yet occurred and is likely not to occur until US forces are drawn down:
The problem lies in the fundamentally flawed belief that providing more security is the key to achieving political compromise. Restoring basic levels of security from the low point of 2006 was indeed essential. But now, contrary to what the authors argue, improved security is making the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki less likely to make meaningful compromises, since Maliki currently sees little downside to not doing so. The Iraqi government simply does not share American assessments of the negative consequences that would result from failing to achieve reconciliation. And as long as the U.S. military protects Iraqi leaders from the consequences of their choices, they are probably correct.
The "authors" to which he refers include Stephen Biddle, who gave a talk here last week. It was well informed and insightful but, ultimately, untimely. His bottom line is that US forces must stay at least two more years, and perhaps longer, in order to assure political accord. Abu Aardvark is arguing the opposite - Iraqi political actors have no real incentive to come to political terms with one another until they know they must bear responsibility for their own security upon the removal of US troops - and I agree with him. We have had too many promises, too many disruptions and crises, to trust that the various Iraqi factions. They now have the economic means to support themselves; let them do so.
Indeed, listening to Biddle, I couldn't help but think: "this is a great talk....for 2004 or so." Americans have moved beyond the war. I cannot imagine much political support for an open-ended commitment, or even for a presence of two more years with no guarantee of withdrawal. And when we add in the inevitable domestic effects of the current economic crisis, most Americans will oppose spending money on the Iraq war. It's just too late for all that.
To put it in Sun Tzu terms, whoever is the next president - which seems most likely to be Obama - he will face a domestic political situation in which pursuing war in Iraq will be out of keeping with the Way (Tao), the very first of Sun Tzu's "fundamental factors" of warfare.
By moral influence (tao) I mean that which causes people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril. 1.4
Iraq, it is safe to say, is not in the American Way.
Bush lost the war.
Bush won the war. The misunderstanding is what the purpose was in the first place. Post 9-11 we needed a poster child for the attack. Hussein was available and convenient. Bush hated him, and like Achmadinijad, he said so many stupid things that he had a bullseye on his back. Bush was also highly susceptible to influence, a side effect of not being very bright, having Messianic tendencies, and seeing the world in terms of good and evil. The neocons Wolfowitz and Pearle, along with the ever dangerous Cheney, sent him on a crusade. When Bush announced on the deck of the Lincoln that the mission was accomplished, he was correct. After all he knew what the mission was, since it was his. Hussein was soon to be hanged, his father's legacy cleared for not finishing the job in Iraq part 1, and the true objective accomplished, one of Israel’s biggest threats would be reduced to throwing rocks at its enemies. No more tanks, missiles, jets, and "elite" guard forces. Nation building and spreading democracy, never entered Bush's mind. He probably would not mind if they happened, but not a big deal. There was no exit strategy because Iran was next, just didn’t get to it. Maybe Obama will.
Posted by: bobboose | October 18, 2008 at 01:09 PM