I have been meaning to blog about Guobin Yang's book, The Power of the Internet in China, (which I used in my class on Chinese politics) and yesterday's news of Google's travails with Chinese hackers makes this a good moment to do so.
To cut right to the chase: Yang presents a very optimistic picture of the internet's transformational potential but the Google situation suggests that it may be just as likely that China will change the internet at least as much as the internet changes China.
To begin with Yang's book, it is really quite good: very well researched, organized and written. It does not have overly ambitious theoretical pretensions but simply lays out an analytic framework that allows him to survey various effects of the internet on China. He brings it all together in the final chapter, where he argues that the information and interactions provided by the internet are fostering simultaneous social and cultural revolutions in China that are, ultimately, democratizing the country. A transformation of individual consciousness (the cultural revolution), not unlike the emergence of rights consciousness described by Merle Goldman, and an efflorescence of civil society associations (the social revolution) are engendering a more critical and active polity, the stirrings of "unofficial democracy." The very last line of the book points the way to the future: "As civic engagements in unofficial democracy expand, the distance to an officially institutionalized democracy shortens."
Yang is not a naive optimist. He recognizes the repressive capacity that the internet provides to the state. All of the various tools of censorship and surveillance are covered, including the disciplinary power of self-censorship, or "soft control" as he puts it. But, for all of the limitations, Yang concludes that the internet is significantly changing China, and changing it in the direction of greater openness, liberalization and democracy.
The Google announcement suggests another possible outcome. At this point, I think Imagethief is right when he argues: "The Chinese government is not likely to cave to an ultimatum from a foreign company, no matter how decorously delivered." Indeed, for the government's point of view there is really little need to compromise. If Google leaves China there will still be search engines to serve the burgeoning web world there, both Chinese and foreign (it could be a boon for Bing). A Google withdrawal would contribute to the perception, and reality, that China is not fully and freely integrated into global information flows - but the CCP is quite willing to admit that now. The Party does not want China to be fully and freely integrated into global information flows because it controls information to bolster its monopoly on domestic political power. No surprises there. Thus, even though some Chinese netizens seem to be mourning the potential loss of Google - leaving flowers at Google's offices in Beijing - the larger political question is: will this inspire some sort of political mobilization among Chinese activists against internet censorship?
It is hard to see that happening now. Yang's analysis would predict a upsurge in internet activism - criticisms of the Party on bulletin boards, perhaps some on-line petitions - and that is likely. But these sorts actions would have to move from virtual forums to sites of more tangible political power to generate meaningful effects. Will the Central Committee be moved by Google's threats? Hard to see that they would. Will people get out on the streets and protest? Given the general pattern of "rigthful resistance" the impact would be limited even if some sort of demonstrations happened, which in itself is unlikely.
So, at the end of the day, the political impact of a possible Google withdrawal from China appears quite limited. And if we take Google as a metonym for the "Internet in China," we might expect that its broader transformational effects will also be constrained by state power. And, to press the implications a bit further, if Google pulls out and other search companies fill the void and prosper, that might reinforce the understanding that the internet must comply and adapt to state power at least as much as state power must adapt to the internet.
But who knows...politics can sometimes change in rapid and unexpected ways. I'm just not betting the farm on significant liberalization or democratization in the very near future.
1. Tools:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-liebman/perspective-on-digital-di_b_416876.html
Too much powers in this room ...
2. Services:
人民向谷歌献花,向遗体告别:
http://www.webjb.org/webjb/viewtopic2.php?topic=10081046&forum=01
http://www.hexun.com/Images/06/76/67672.jpg
Posted by: isha | January 13, 2010 at 04:13 PM
爆竹声中一岁除,春风送暖入屠苏。千门万户曈曈日,总把新桃换旧符。
Posted by: isha | January 14, 2010 at 09:28 AM
Some background information: a very good speech by Kai-Fu Lee Lecture: Google in China
February 07, 2008
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgDGNPnb124
It is all about market share!
Posted by: isha | January 14, 2010 at 10:49 AM
China Responds To Google
http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-china-responds-to-google-go-to-hell-2010-1
If this were in good old days of the 18XX, some smart looking gunboats are already shooting at the city of Canton ...
January 15, 2010, 7:18 pm
Can Google Beat China?
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/can-google-beat-china/
Yes, We Can?
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/chinawar.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/addiction_at_gun_point/&usg=__gtWsLOxnMqypu8OxOBfeqPLWDDE=&h=355&w=663&sz=414&hl=en&start=18&um=1&tbnid=o3qDSq2u4WBt_M:&tbnh=74&tbnw=138&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dcanton%2Bchina%2Bhistory%2Bopium%2Bwar%2Bgun%2Bboats%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D1W1ADSA_en%26um%3D1
别了,斯徒雷登!
希望你别再回来.
Posted by: isha | January 16, 2010 at 01:16 AM