Yan Xuetong, History and Philosophy

Sorry for the blog silence - lots of work and distractions.  But I'm back now...

Yesterday's op-ed in the NYT by Chinese international relations academic, Yan Xuetong, has sparked a great deal of discussion on listservs and web sites.  Manyul has already posted on it here, where I made a hasty comment yesterday.  Today I want to develop my response a bit more....

Yan's op-ed is a condensation of his more recent book, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, in which he plumbs pre-Qin texts for insights into international politics, since the Warring States period was essentially a multipolar political struggle, and extends that thinking to the contemporary world.  A good review of that work can be found here.  Yan's thinking is complex.  He is situating himself in the intellectual realm of international relations theorists, identifying himself as a "realist," but engaging in normative theory, an "idealist"(pdf!) project typically shunned by realists.  He is also crafting arguments that speak as much to the need for domestic political reform within the PRC as with that state's foreign policy.  Some interesting stuff there...

But back to the op-ed.

I am concerned that, in his realist-idealist mash-up, Yan conflates history and normative theory.  In speaking about the pre-Qin period, he writes:

It was perhaps the greatest period for Chinese thought, and several schools competed for ideological supremacy and political influence. They converged on one crucial insight: The key to international influence was political power, and the central attribute of political power was morally informed leadership. Rulers who acted in accordance with moral norms whenever possible tended to win the race for leadership over the long term.

China was unified by the ruthless king of Qin in 221 B.C., but his short-lived rule was not nearly as successful as that of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, who drew on a mixture of legalistic realism and Confucian “soft power” to rule the country for over 50 years, from 140 B.C. until 86 B.C.

While it may be true that many philosophers agreed on the need for morally informed leadership - Confucians, Mohists - Legalists, especially as demonstrated by Hanfeizi, did not.  Han was merciless in his critique of Confucians, referring to them as one of the "Five Vermin."  From that chapter of his book we read:

Thus King Wen practiced benevolence and righteousness and became ruler of the world, but King Yen practiced benevolence and righteousness and destroyed his state.  This is because benevolence and righteousness served for ancient times, but no longer serve today. 

Of course, Han offered counsel to, and ultimately died at the command of, the Qin king, a man infamous for his trampling on benevolence and righteousness.

What is important to note here is that the prominence of the ideal of humane rulership was limited.  It was expounded by Confucian intellectuals but not embraced by many of the actual rulers of pre-Qin states.  If we learn anything from Mencius, it is the existence of so many political leaders whose rule was far from the standards of Humanity he advocated.

Qin Shihuangdi was the most ruthless, inhumane of them all.  And he was the ultimate victor of the Warring States period.  His state, Qin, unified, by brutal force of arms, all the rest.  Moreover, the political structure and legal system developed by Qin continued on long after the demise of his short-lived dynasty.  In that sense, Legalism won the political battle, for it was Legalism that determined the structure of Chinese states historically.

I mention this to counter Yan's statement that: "Rulers who acted in accordance with moral norms whenever possible tended to win the race for leadership over the long term."  That is not empirically true.  While many dynasties from the Han forward invoked Confucianism as a moral justification, they all also relied upon Legalist means and powers to maintain state authority.  Never was Confucianism sufficient, in and of itself, to support a Chinese state.  Victoria Hui is helpful here (pdf!):

The problem is that the actual Chinese tradition is better characterized by Legalism than by Confucianism. Legalism is the nemesis of Confucianism, for it is single-mindedly concerned with the maximization of state power through strict regulations and cruel punishments in domestic rule and territorial expansion in external relations. But many Chinese mistake Confucianism as the single Chinese tradition because Chinese rulers ingeniously followed what Chinese scholar Hsiao Kung-chuan called “Legalism with a Confucian façade.”

In the second paragraph above Yan seems to recognize this.  But in his realist-idealist melange he leans more to idealism as a source of explanation (or should we accept his self-definition as a "realist" and suspect that he is simply creating a diversion to make us think that humaneness matters while the PRC amasses material power?... I don't think so.  I suspect he is simply historically un-moored in his idealism...) . 

Why did Chinese states "succeed" in their foreign policies?  Why did they become preeminent in the region and the pinnacle of a hierarchical tribute system?  Was it the attractive "soft power" of their Confucian ideals?  Or was it based on the power of Chinese militaries and the fear and prudence that power instilled in other peoples?  Yan does not focus much on the latter (so much for his "realism") but expects us to simply accept the former.

Don't get me wrong: I think Confucian ideals of humane rulership are great.  I wish leaders in China and the US and elsewhere would embrace them.  But I recognize the uncomfortable reality that those ideals have been honored much more in the breech historically, especially in China.  We cannot simply ignore the very large presence of military and coercive power in Chinese history (pdf!).  When the Han dynasty expanded westward, it did so through military means, as did every other imperial expansion in Chinese history.  Chinese states, like all states everywhere, have been founded on power and coercion, and we must kept that historical fact in mind when we are considering how the Chinese past might be relevant to the global present.

I worry here because there is a kind of Chinese exceptionalism to be found in certain intellectual circles. The idea is that China is unique historically because it did not rely upon military power in its relations with other states.  Nicola DiCosmo, in the introduction to his edited book (linked to above), writes about:

....the influential perception that Chinese culture was inherently indifferent to the gritty matter of battles and wars and consequently paid little or no heed to military topics.  This perception has been interpreted as a preeminently late imperial and twentieth- century product and linked to the concept of an “amilitary” or perhaps “demilitarized” culture (wu bing wenhua)....

It is this perception that Yan is, intentionally or not, bringing forward in his arguments.  And it is simply historically inaccurate.  If we are to take seriously his assertions about the contemporary utitliy of ancient Chinese thought (and I believe there is some utility there),  he needs to be more explicit about the realities of China's past, especially the power realities of state-building and empire-making.

I should add that I absolutely agree with Yan when he argues in the op-ed:

How, then, can China win people’s hearts across the world? According to ancient Chinese philosophers, it must start at home. Humane authority begins by creating a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad.

This means China must shift its priorities away from economic development to establishing a harmonious society free of today’s huge gaps between rich and poor. It needs to replace money worship with traditional morality and weed out political corruption in favor of social justice and fairness.

Unfortunately, I do not see any of this happening now.  The PRC regime is not addressing legal injustice (as depressingly made plain by the Chen Guangcheng situation), economic inequality or political corruption.  

I wonder, then, if Yan would agree that the PRC government should focus its attention on these very pressing internal problems and concern itself less with expanding its global power or pressuring Taiwan?  I suspect the realist in Yan would say "no."

Comments

[David Bandurski]

Fantastic post. Thanks!

[Godfree Roberts]

The PRC seems to be doing a pretty good job Of favoring social justice and fairness, especially when compared to our own regime. They score an 86% trust and approval from the Chinese people.

Our regime rates the inverse: 14%. (Surveys: Pew Charitable Trusts).

Perhaps we should delay criticizing and advising the PRC until we can match our words with their deeds.

[hanmeng]

Great analysis. Yan seems to know little of Chinese history.

The PRC hardly favors social justice and fairness; look at the gap between city and country. As for their high scores on trust and approval, they are based in no small part on keeping a tight lid on dissent.

If that's what you want, it's good news that the Obama regime is continuing his predecessor's encroachment on Americans' civil liberties. First they keep an eye on us; next they'll tell us to shut up.

[shaohua hu]

Dear Sam,

I was referred to your piece today, and found it interesting and insightful. Time is fleeting. I recall the Thanksgiving meal we had 23 three year ago at the Nanjing Center. How the world has changed since then.

I just want to wish you and your family a happy Thanksgiving.

Shaohua

[Sam]

Shaohua!

Great to hear from you. Yes, I remember that Thanksgiving well. I trust you and your family are well. Are you ever in my part of Massachusetts? It would be great to see you again.

Best wishes,

Sam

[Hang]

I just wanted to find some discussions on Yan's op-ed and by accident read this wonderful piece. Your argument is so coherent and thought-provoking. I only found the Nanjing Center name in the comments.
Proud to be part of the center. - Hang of HNC '10

[Cburell]

Late to this, I know, but I find your example of Han expansion under Wudi problematic. The Xiongnu were raiding Han settlements relentlessly, and Wudi sent troops to try to eliminate this aggressive northern threat. In the end, the Han troops were unable to engage and defeat the more mobile enemy, so they extended the Great Wall and garrisoned it to defend against future Xiongnu incursions--in a sparsely inhabited, mostly desert territory at that. To characterize what was essentially a defensive military operation as an historical case of "Chinese aggression" thus seems, at best, lacking in nuance.

Similar arguments can be made about the Song, who followed a conscious imperial policy of "peaceful co-existence" with the Khitan Liao, the Tangut Xi Xia, and the Jurchen Jin states on it's northern and northwestern borders with only a couple of exceptions over 300 years.

The Ming conduct abroad in SE Asia and the Indian Ocean basin during the three decades of Zhengzhou He's voyages--which, consisting of 300 ships and 30,000 men at full strength, could have pursued territorial expansion quite easily with such overwhelming force, _but didn't_--is another piece of evidence that China, historically, was indeed uncommonly 'a-militaristic'.

China obviously has its problems, as does (in spades) the contemporary West. But this shouldn't tempt us to deny that its history is often far more impressively civilized than most other world civilizations.

[Cburell]

Blasted iPad auto-correct is to thank for the weird typos above. Of course I meant "its," not "it's," and Zheng He, not (lol) "Zhengzhou He"!

[Sam]

I did not use the term "Chinese aggression." My point was simply that the Han, and Chinese dynasties more generally, are not exceptional in how they develop and use power. The Han's success, its territorial expansion, was based on its military power. That is how all historically great powers have expanded and dominated large territories. DiCosmo's analysis is what needs to be kept in mind...