I have not blogged the NYT Sunday Modern Love column is a while, but today's is too good to ignore.
Angela Balcita writes a marvelous piece about her health problems and how they bring the best out of, first, her brother, and then, her boyfriend. When she was a freshman in college she was diagnosed with a serious kidney ailment. Her brother stepped up and offered one of his kidneys for a transplant, in an act of pure sibling love. Some years later, her kidney failed again and, this time, her boyfriend, who knew about her earlier operation and the possibilities of future complications, also stepped up to offer his organ for transplant. It worked and they have lived happily, unmarried, ever after.
The beauty of this story is the depth of the commitments involved. To some degree a brother might be expected to give up a kidney for a sister. Balcita does not dwell on this aspect of the story, perhaps because it is ethically somewhat less unusual (though she gives him due props). But I am sure that she would agree that we should not overlook the humanity of her brother. He did the brotherly thing - and, sad to say, not all brothers do or would. He fully realized his moral duty as brother and, as such, should be recognized as exemplary in a Confucian sense.
There is a link here to the conference I just attended. In thinking about how Confucianism might be applicable to modern (postmodern) life, some people, most notably Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, are working on a notion of "role ethics." This is an adaptation of Confucianism that, I imagine (they only provided a preliminary sketch of their thinking), runs something like this: our moral duties are defined not just by universal obligations (say, against killing innocents) but also, and significantly, by our social roles. If you are a father, there are certainly fatherly things you must do (care for you children and wife); if you are a brother, there are certain brotherly things you must do; etc. How we conceive of ourselves as moral persons, and how we are judged by others or society at large, as moral persons, must therefore include consideration of how well we fulfill the specific duties that attach to the various social roles we have. I, for example, am a son, father, brother, nephew, husband, son-in-law, teacher, colleague, friend, among other roles. Any calculation (can we call it that?) of my ethical accomplishments or failings would, from a "role ethics" perspective, be some kind of summation of my moral standing in all of these particular roles.
So, the brother is good because he fulfilled his brotherly role.
The boyfriend is a different story, however. Should a boyfriend be expected, in his role as boyfriend, to go so far as to provide a kidney for transplant? I think the short answer is "no." But Balcita's boyfriend, Christopher, did. This would seem to exceed the ethical imperatives of boyfriend-ness and be, as such, exceedingly good. Or, it could do something else: it could challenge an overly formal definition of "role."
Obviously, in this case, the boyfriend was acting in the manner of a husband, who would, if the medical conditions were right, be expected to provide a kidney. All that was missing here was the formal commitment of marriage. Balcita reflects upon this:
Christopher’s version of our fairy tale has always been a bit different
from mine, a little more pragmatic. When I say: “Marriage? What do we
need marriage for? The fact that you gave me your kidney should show
the world that we’re destined to be together,” he says, “Well, maybe we
should get married so my health benefits can pay for your lab tests and
maintenance drugs.”
What strikes me here is that the commitment is prior to, both temporally and ethically, the institutionalization of the relationship in marriage. And I think this is quite in keeping with Confucian sensibilities. Just going through the motions of formalized personal duties is insufficient for Confucian ethics. One must be truly and genuinely committed to cultivating our closest loving relationships because it is there that we create and extend our own, and ultimately the world's, humanity. In a sense, then, marriage matters less than commitment.
Interestingly, Christopher's comment shows how commitments may need to be institutionalized if they are to be fulfilled. Gaining access to better health insurance is something that marriage might facilitate; thus, the formalization of the commitment allows for the commitment to be better lived and realized.
But the bigger point here is, I think, commitment. That is what matters most here. That is what makes this story beautiful. And it should tell us that how we define "roles" is not simply a matter of formalized social positions and expectations, but may also be shaped by the distribution of our personal commitments.
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