The Useless Tree

Kylo Ren, Finn, and Confucian Morality

In the new Star Wars movie, two characters form a converse pair: Kylo Ren, son of Han Solo and Leia Skywalker, had been trained as a Jedi Knight but turned to the Dark Side; Finn, on the other hand, had been taken from his family when young and made into a First Order stormtrooper, but he defected to the resistance when confronted with the brutality of his commanders.  Kylo Ren started out as a "good" person who went bad, and Finn is an apparently "bad" person who turned to the good.  And that contrast tells us something about Confucian morality.

What do we mean when we refer to someone as a "good person" or a "bad person"?  Implicit in those constructions is a kind of essentialist assumption: a person is inherently, by nature, "good" or "bad."  He or she is defined existentially with a certain moral quality. There is, however, a problem in this way of thinking.  Most obviously, a seemingly good person can do something bad.  When such things happen, it can surprise us - we never expected that an individual known to be good could act so badly - and we might even pause and question whether the apparently bad act could actually have some sort of hidden virtue that we can't yet comprehend.  Our perplexity might inspire a search for mitigating circumstances: surely one so good could only have done something so bad as a result of malign external forces.  Ultimately, forgiveness could be a ready option, at least until we see if the purported good person acts badly again.  Generally, we want to give the good person the benefit of the doubt when he or she does something bad.

On the flip side, we might also accept the idea that some people are just bad, inherently and irremediably bad. We have expressions for this:
"he's just a bad seed" or "he's bad to the bone." In the US, this sort of thinking could explain the depressing lack of rehabilitative programs for convicted criminals.  Although we say we believe in second chances, we also do not want to spend money or effort on people who seem to be immutably bad.

There is another side to this story: the diffuse Christian-inspired belief in forgiveness and salvation.  A person who has done bad things, who might be tagged as naturally bad, might be made good again.  And this is where Confucianism comes in.

Mencius is famous for asserting that human nature is inherently good.  This widely held interpretation is, however, a bit oversimplified, since he also recognizes that humans are complex and have both good and bad aspects.  Although this excerpt from passage 6A.14 is referring explicitly to the "body" - 體 - it has implications for human nature and the cultivation of virtue more generally:

體有貴賤，有小大。無以小害大，無以賤害貴。養其小者為小人，養其大者為大人

Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man.

If you cultivate what is good in you, through good actions, you will produce good effects in the world, and that will define a certain goodness about you.  But the expression of goodness is not automatic. There are parts of us, not just physical parts but psychic parts as well, that are bad and could form the basis for bad actions if we choose to develop that side of our selves.

Goodness, then, is a matter of choice and action, it is performative, not existential.  We can see this emphasis on doing good to be good in these excerpts from Mencius 6B.2:

 曹交問曰：「人皆可以為堯舜，有諸？

Jiao of Cao asked Mencius, saying, 'It is said, "All men may be Yaos and Shuns;"-- is it so?'

 孟子曰：「然。」

Mencius replied, 'It is.'

 「交聞文王十尺，湯九尺，今交九尺四寸以長，食粟而已，如何則可？」

Jiao went on, 'I have heard that king Wen was ten cubits high, and Tang nine. Now I am nine cubits four inches in height. But I can do nothing but eat my millet. What am I to do to realize that saying?'

 曰：「奚有於是？亦為之而已矣。有人於此，力不能勝一匹雛，則為無力人矣；今曰舉百鈞，則為有力人矣。然則舉烏獲之任，是亦為烏獲而已矣。夫人豈以不勝為 患哉？弗為耳。徐行後長者謂之弟，疾行先長者謂之不弟。夫徐行者，豈人所不能哉？所不為也。堯舜之道，孝弟而已矣。子服堯之服，誦堯之言，行堯之行，是堯 而已矣；子服桀之服，誦桀之言，行桀之行，是桀而已矣。」

Mencius answered him, 'What has this - the question of size - to do with the matter? It all lies simply in acting as such. Here is a man, whose strength was not equal to lift a duckling - he was then a man of no strength. But today he says, "I can lift 3,000 catties' weight," and he is a man of strength. And so, he who can lift the weight which Wu Huo lifted is just another Wu Huo. Why should a man make a want of ability the subject of his grief? It is only that he will not do the thing. To walk slowly, keeping behind his elders, is to perform the part of a younger. To walk quickly and precede his elders, is to violate the duty of a younger brother. Now, is it what a man cannot do - to walk slowly? It is what he does not do. The course of Yao and Shun was simply that of filial piety and fraternal duty. Wear the clothes of Yao, repeat the words of Yao, and do the actions of Yao, and you will just be a Yao. And, if you wear the clothes of Jie, repeat the words of Jie, and do the actions of Jie, you will just be a Jie

Some background: Yao and Shun are legendary sage-kings of exemplary virtue; King Wen is one of the righteous founders of the Zhou Dynasty; Tang is the good king of the Xia period; and Jie is an infamous tyrant.

The key message of this passage is: if you want to be like Yao and Shun, if you aspire to moral goodness of the highest order, just do it, just act like Yao and Shun.  There are no unique capacities that they had that enabled their goodness.  They simply chose to perform goodness consistently.   The reference to the mythical strongman Wu Huo underscores the emphasis on intention and effort as opposed to physical limitation.  A weak man, unable to lift a duckling, can become a strongman with focused effort. A bad man can similarly choose to do good and be good.

Notice, too, the opposite possibility: "if you do the actions of Jie, you will just be a Jie."  And that's bad.  For Menicus, and all Confucians, you really do not want to be a Jie, you should want to be a Yao or Shun.  And you can be, if you just do the right thing now and tomorrow and into the future.

And that brings us back to our Star Wars characters.

Finn, it turns out, is the ultimate Mencian: even though he had been coerced into cultivating what was bad in him, he maintained enough moral autonomy to realize he was being made to act badly.  And then he chose to do the right thing. That took some courage, given his circumstances, but he illustrates a central Confucian principle: it is always possible to do good, and in so doing, be good.

Kylo Ren is obviously a Jie.  He appears to be fully conscious and in control of his decisions and he chooses to do the absolutely worst thing by Confucian standards: he kills his father.  Yet, even after that horrific act, he might still be redeemed.  Historically, Confucian principles were codified into legal statues in imperial China, and if a son willfully killed a father he would most certainly be put to death himself in punishment.  But the moral logic of Confucianism, detached from legal institutionalization, would hold out the possibility of atonement.  If he recognizes his terrible transgression, and if he commits himself to actions that clearly exemplify right conduct, if he were to "wear the clothes of Yao, repeat the words of Yao, and do the actions of Yao," then he might still be able to "just be a Yao."

We'll just have to wait for episodes 8 and 9 to see if he comes around to the light side of the Confucian force.

 

Further to a Critique of "The China Model"

In our exchange at Parlio, Daniel Bell has raised a question that has spurred me to a lengthy response, one that fits better here than at the bottom of the comments section there.

Daniel asks:

“What, if anything, did you learn that changed (or enriched) your normative political outlook -- i.e., something new and different compared to "Western-style liberal democracy" you learned in the US -- and that you think can and should be used as a standard to evaluate political progress and regress in China?... I'm a bit worried that you pick and choose from the Chinese tradition only those parts that fit your pre-existing normative political framework, but I hope to be proven wrong :)”

We’ll ignore the suggestion that I “pick and choose from the Chinese tradition,” which could easily be turned about here, and go right to the heart of the question.

I have learned many things from my study of ancient Chinese philosophy and contemporary Chinese politics. First, from the Confucian tradition, I have come to appreciate an understanding of personhood that diverges from the standard assumptions of liberalism. We might, after Henry Rosemont Jr., frame this as a distinction between a “rights-bearing individual” (liberalism) and a “role-bearing person;” or take Gish Jen’s formulation of an “interdependent self” (Confucianism) versus an “independent self.” In either case, Confucian personhood is dynamically constructed in constant interaction with others, it is never wholly autonomous and socially isolated. I draw out the implications of this notion of personhood for a variety of contemporary American social issues in my recent book.

I have also learned that this Confucian role-bearing person, this interdependent self, in order to make informed ethical choices about how to live a good life in relation to others requires a certain moral autonomy. Each person must, as Mencius says, look inside of him- or her-self to determine how possibly conflicting social obligations might best be prioritized. No external authority, and certainly no governmental authority, can tell a person how to be the best person he or she can be, especially when that person is faced with difficult ethical choices. At times, albeit rarely, one might even have to choose to disobey one’s parents in order to do the right thing, as legendary sage-king Shun did when he married without informing his parents. But persons must have a modicum of freedom to make decisions about what they believe is the right thing to do, as is suggested by Analects 9.26: 三軍可奪帥也，匹夫不可奪志也. – “"The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him."

What Chinese history and philosophy has also taught me is that the greatest danger to the moral autonomy necessary to live a good, Confucian life is the tyrannical abuse of highly centralized political power. I understand that moral autonomy is not the same as political autonomy but, especially in the context of modern state power (as in the PRC since 1949), it is clear that an individual’s moral autonomy can be inhumanely destroyed by repressive political power. The Maoist period of PRC history is a distressing demonstration of what happens when the state robs individuals of their moral autonomy.

During the Great Leap Famine, the terrible man- and Mao-made famine of 1958-1962, untold numbers of Chinese families were destroyed by the actions of the Chinese Communist Party. Political authorities created conditions so horrific that individuals were forced to act in ways they knew were morally repugnant. Many people resisted the state, and died, and in death retained their moral coherence. They chose not to live instead of living immorally. But their deaths – and at times those deaths were publicly inflicted and displayed – created a climate of fear and intimidation that forced others to act against their personal moral bearings. From a Confucian perspective, it was a holocaust, a deeply inhumane war on families.

The CCP worked hard to destroy Confucian morality. The Great Leap Famine was followed by the Cultural Revolution, and the structural and psychological power of the state narrowed the space of personal moral autonomy to the point of near non-existence. Confucianism survived this unrelenting attack through the care and work of scholars outside of China, people like Mou Zongsan, Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, and Tu Weiming.

Thus, what I have learned from contemporary Chinese politics is that the CCP tried very hard to destroy Confucianism, and the philosophy and way of life survived largely because it was cultivated in politically freer contexts outside of the PRC.

Perhaps apologists for PRC authoritarianism might want to argue that all that terrible Great Leap Famine and Cultural Revolution stuff are things of the past. The PRC is different now and Confucianism is back. Although there is truth in that assertion, there are also other truths: the Party still arrogates to itself unrestricted power which can, and is, used in ways that shrink the space of moral autonomy for many Chinese people. Thus Yu Ying-shi, argues: “…for a certain organization [the CCP] on the mainland to support Confucianism amounts to the kiss of death for Confucianism.” And that is because the lack of protections of individual rights, which provide a legal bulwark against the restriction of personal moral autonomy, renders the political environment of the PRC inhospitable to Confucian morality. Tu Weiming makes a similar point:

“Paradoxically, the Confucian personality ideals (the authentic person, the worthy, or the sage) can be realized more fully in liberal democratic society than in either a traditional imperial dictatorship or a modern authoritarian regime.”

So, the last lesson that I will mention here is this: I have learned from my study of Chinese philosophy and Chinese politics that the rhetorical construction of the “West” versus “China” denies a more complex historical reality of constant movement of ideas and cultural practices from place to place over time. After recounting several examples of 19th and early 20th century Chinese scholars thinking creatively about the intersections and cross-fertilizations of Confucian and “Western” ideas, Yu Ying-shi concludes: “…we can acknowledge that Confucian values are completely consistent with the universal values observed in the modern West, and Confucian values are most definitely not completely opposed to these western values.”

And that reminds me of another passage from The Analects, 12.5, one that suggests that Confucian morality is itself an expression of universal values:

“Si Ma Niu, full of anxiety, said, "Other men all have their brothers, I only have not." Zi Xia said to him, "There is the following saying which I have heard - 'Death and life have their determined appointment; riches and honors depend upon Heaven.' Let the superior man never fail reverentially to order his own conduct, and let him be respectful to others and observant of propriety - then all within the four seas will be his brothers. What has the superior man to do with being distressed because he has no brothers?"”

司馬牛憂曰：「人皆有兄弟，我獨亡。」子夏曰：「商聞之矣：死生有命，富貴在天。君子敬而無失，與人恭而有禮。四海之內，皆兄弟也。君子何患乎無兄弟也？

All men are brothers, all people are family.

Mou Zongsan

Two (more) defects of the "China Model"

 

I have been in a discussion, over at Parlio, with Daniel Bell about his book, The China Model.  It's getting a bit long and I thought I would post some of my comments, as a single piece, here, and then move on, in another post, to some other issues.  Here is some of what I have posted at Parlio:

 

    Daniel Bell's book, The China Model, has already attracted pointed criticism by political scientists. Andrew Nathan finds that the book “…is not an account of the real China.” Stein Ringen  writes that Bell’s analysis “…falls into empirical descriptions that are just bizarre.”

    I will state at the outset that I am sympathetic to these critiques . Empirically, Bell’s assertion that China is characterized by “democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top” is deeply flawed, and interpretive weaknesses ultimately undercut his normative argument in favor of meritocracy. With that in mind, I will try not to simply repeat the previous criticisms but add two points.

    First, somewhat less critical attention has been paid to the initial element of the “China Model,” Bell’s general characterization of village-level elections that have emerged in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1987. Although he recognizes that “…there is a substantial gap between reality and the ideal” (189), his condensed tag line – “democracy at the bottom” – leaves the impression that some sort of genuine democracy is to be found at the lowest levels of political administration in China. As is well documented by electoral practices in many authoritarian regimes around the world, however, voting does not equal democracy. Far from it. Bell’s thin evidentiary basis does make a wan nod toward the obvious restrictions on democratic politics in Chinese villages, but stricter scrutiny of local politics in the PRC leads inexorably to the conclusion that the jaunty phrase “democracy at the bottom” obscures more than it reveals about political realities in the PRC.

    Bell quotes research by Kevin O’Brien and Rongbin Han: “electoral procedures have improved greatly in the past two decades and a good number of competitive and reasonably fair elections have been held.” (Bell, 189) And he goes further to recognize O’Brien and Han’s key point that elections move toward effective democracy only to the extent that they yield meaningful change in how citizens, or their representatives, are able to exercise political power. But his brief recognition of the limits of village “democracy” misses the broader significance of O’Brien and Han’s work. Quite simply, they reject a procedural definition of democracy because “…democracy does not simply denote majority rule, but instead is usually seen to be a congeries of institutions that guarantees rule of law, separation of powers, protection of minorities, and protection of civil liberties” (O'Brien and Han, 361). Without such fundamental elements as rule of law, unhampered by Party power, and the protection of civil liberties, which are increasingly under threat in the PRC today, there is no real “democracy at the bottom” in China.

    The case of Wukan in Guangdong province, where it seemed like meaningful political change might come through local election but was later thwarted by higher authorities, is instructive in this regard.

    It could be true that village elections are creating a potential for democracy in China. To say, however, that at some unspecified point in the future, and after significant political-institutional change, democracy might be possible, is a very different kind of statement than the implicit description of China now having “democracy at the bottom.” At present, it would be more accurate to characterize local politics in the PRC as authoritarianism plus elections.

    A second, more general problem involves the role that meritocracy can play in political legitimacy. Quite simply, meritocracy, in and of itself, does not provide political legitimacy for any type of regime, authoritarian, democratic, or hybrid. Indeed, meritocracy itself must be justified by other means of legitimization, most prominently democracy. Bell recognizes this trouble: “The problem of legitimacy, however, can only be addressed by means of democratic reforms, including some form of explicit consent by the people” (150). But the obstacle is greater than he acknowledges.

    The problem is epistemological: how can we know that leaders who claim to be meritocratic truly are and will continue to be meritocratic? Passing an examination does not really answer this question. It only provides the briefest snapshot of a person’s knowledge, or the perception of his character, at a particular time. If meritocracy is a matter of selecting and promoting “leaders of superior ability and virtue” (2) then it is performative, not existential. A meritocrat is meritocratic only as long as he acts meritocratically.

    This is a very Confucian idea. Analects 15.18 reads: “The Master said, ‘The superior man in everything considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility. He completes it with sincerity. This is indeed a superior man.’” The moral person performs goodness through focused and conscientious action, “ritual”: 禮以行之.  If you do not perform virtue, you are not virtuous.

    And how do we know if a leader is performing virtuously? We assess the effects of his or her actions, we look at whether or not politics and policies produce morally good outcomes. In terms of legitimacy, what appears to be meritocratic legitimacy is, in actuality, a proxy for performance legitimacy, how well a regime “delivers the goods” to the people. Although Bell wants to distinguish meritocratic legitimacy from performance legitimacy, in fact such a distinction is impossible. We can only know whether a leader is living up to a claim of virtue through his or her performance.

    Bell further argues that PRC citizens tend to value patriarchal meritocracy: “…the majority of Chinese people endorse ‘guardianship discourse,’ defined as the need to ‘identify high-quality politicians who care about people’s demands, take people’s interests in consideration when making decisions, and choose good policies on behalf of their people and society’…” (147)

    But, again, how do they know that their leaders are living up to this ideal? They must base their judgment on the outcomes leaders create. Mao Zedong believed that the Great Leap Forward was a good thing; he, and a large portion of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, believed it was in line with what “the people” wanted. It was, however, a horrible disaster which, though still muffled in Chinese media and academia, gives the lie to the wisdom of an elite who claimed a kind of “virtuocracy.”

    Of course, precisely because of the failure of Maoist revolutionary meritocracy, PRC leaders now lean on economic growth as the basis of performance legitimacy for the authoritarian regime. The expectation is that as long as a sufficient portion of the population believe that their material lives are improving, they will accept the political limitations of single party dictatorship. So far it seems to be working. Since the nation-wide protests of 1989, a serious challenge to the regime legitimacy, the Party has worked hard to maintain high growth rates. It has been helped in this project, first, by relatively inexpensive labor for manufacturing exports, and, second, by cheap money, as debt-driven expenditures boosted real estate development and other infrastructural projects. Under those conditions, after the government had stopped the economically irrational policies of the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of millions of hard-working Chinese individuals have built better lives for themselves. Although localized protests and demonstrations abound, the overall strategy still seems to be effective: the Party-state is strong.

    The problem the PRC faces now, however, is the problem any sort of performance-based legitimization faces: what have you done for me lately? Economic growth is starting to decline. Chinese capital is seeking better investment conditions overseas and Chinese students are flocking to colleges and universities in the US and Europe. The best opportunities may no longer be found within the borders of the PRC for those people with the means to look elsewhere. If more and more PRC citizens come to believe that the regime is not delivering the goods, will they continue to see their leaders as “high-quality politicians who care about people’s demands”?

    In the end, neither democracy nor meritocracy exist in the PRC, and even if meritocracy did exist, it would not provide legitimacy for the authoritarian regime. This is not to say that current political institutions are weak. They are not. The Communist Party has, since the passing of Mao, attended assiduously to maintaining its hegemony, and more than twenty five years of robust economic growth and development have provided it a certain performance legitimacy. What happens if economic growth falters further is anybody’s guess, but if that happens the invocation of “meritocracy” in China will likely elicit sharply sarcastic laughter from most Chinese citizens.

Friday Yi Jing Blogging: Yankees will win Wild Card playoff game next week!

Using the Yi Jing to predict the outcome of sporting events is a tricky enterprise, as my Super Bowl forecast demonstrated this year.  But the Yi always leaves open the possibility of human folly and contingency, and, thus, is not itself responsible for our inability to either understand or correctly act upon the wisdom of the oracle.  In other words, it's always appropriate to ask the Yi Jing whether the New York Yankees will win.  And when I asked today about next week's wild card playoff game, the Yi came back with a generally favorable response.  As that profound Yi Jing interpreter, John Sterling, might say: "Yankees win!  Th-th-th-th-the Yankess!  Win!"

For those keeping score at home, the Yi presented me with Hexagram 59, "Dispersion," with moving lines in the first two positions, thus tending toward Hexagram 42, "Increase."

                                                    

"Dispersion"                                                   "Increase"

The Judgment of "Dispersion" gets off to a good start: "Success. The king approaches his temple. It furthers one to cross the great water. Perseverance furthers."  Success!  It is tempting to interpret "temple" here as the hallowed ground of Yankee Stadium, but perhaps that is too literal a take.  "Crossing the great water," too, should not be taken literally: it usually implies that undertaking some significant task - like playing a single win-or-go-home playoff game - is auspicious.  The Yi tells us how the Yankees should approach these favorable circumstances, since nothing is automatic either in baseball or prophecy.  They need to maintain their team unity and follow the guidance of their leader, manager Joe Girardi.

The line statements make this even clearer.  The moving line in the first position of Hexagram 59 tells us: "He brings help with the strength of a horse. Good fortune."  The Wilhelm commentary continues: "...when hidden divergences in temper make themselves felt and lead to mutual misunderstandings, we must take quick and vigorous action to dissolve misunderstandings and mutual distrust."  So, who is the "horse" here?  It could be Tanaka, who has been a stalwart as starting pitcher this season and will take the mound on Tuesday.  But the suggestion that "vigorous action" might be necessary could imply that Girardi will need to step in quickly should Tanaka falter and bring one of his other horses, most notably Betances.  And should that have to happen early in the game, the team should accept it and stay united in their efforts.

Indeed, the nine in the second place points to some difficulty in the game: "He hurries to that which supports him. Remorse disappears."  The mention of momentary remorse here is ominous.  It could be that the Yankees fall behind early, that Tanaka is not as effective as hoped, and that Girardi might need to go to the bullpen early.  But don't fear Yankee fans, clear leadership should yield good results.  As the Minford translation states (and I am drawing on that text more and more as a supplement to the standard Wilhelm volume): "seize the moment. Regret goes away."  

The tendency toward "Increase" is also favorable.  Certainly, the modern connotations of the character 益, yi - "profit, benefit, advantage" - bode well for the pinstripes.  And the Judgment of this hexagram also encourages playing the game: "It furthers one to undertake something.  It furthers on to cross the great water."  All of this furthering suggests the Yanks will get through to the next stage of the playoffs.

It should be noted, however, that weather could be a problem.  Hexagram 59 is the combination of wind above and water below, and Hexagram 42 is wind above and thunder below; all of which suggests inclemency.  

But, whatever the weather, it looks like good fortune ahead for the Bronx Bombers. 

Go Yankees!                 

 

Making Confucianism Relevant to Americans

In my ongoing work to understand what Confucianism can mean in modern American contexts, I am returning to a paper I wrote for an academic conference a couple of years ago.  My thinking on the topic has expanded since then, but I want to build off of this earlier work to produce a new, somewhat more abstract analysis of how systems of ideas move from one historical-cultural context to another (I am tentatively calling this process "philosophical transposition").  In any event, I have never attempted to publish the earlier paper, nor even have I posted it before here.  I do that now, below, in the hopes that others will read it and provide me with some useful feedback.   Please do send all comments and criticisms.  Thanks !

Download Confucianism in Modern American Life

(Above is a Word file; I'll also put a pdf here below for convenience sake):

Download Confucianism in Modern American Life

 

Reading "On Liberty" in Beijing

I'm back in Beijing teaching a course, "Confucianism in America," for the International Summer School at Renmin University of China, just like last year. We got started on Monday: thirty students, most all Renda undergraduates, reading and thinking about how Confucianism might move into and gain a presence in American cultural contexts. 

I was quite happy with how things went last year, but I did tweak the readings a bit this time around. Understanding the kinds of cultural assumptions most Americans hold is a challenge for young Chinese students who have had little direct experience with the United States.  My problem then is: how to begin to introduce them to American culture and attitudes?  What summarizing concepts best capture the American zeitgeist?  As a person who studies politics, political concepts often are the first to come into my mind and for this purpose "liberalism," broadly construed, seems to fit the bill.

I am thinking of liberalism as a cultural orientation, one which foregrounds individuality and the expectation of certain rights and freedoms. It emerges from a particular tradition of political thought but has taken on a wider and more diffuse cultural presence in US society. On this account both political "liberals" and "conservatives" share certain core liberal assumptions.  One of the readings I gave to my students was the chapter on "Liberalism" from the Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, which emphasizes the multiplicity of its expression over time and contemporaneously, as well as its contradictions and dangers. 

The second reading was the opening pages from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. It is striking how this chapter, published in 1859, captures something basic about contemporary American sensibilities.  For example:

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

 Mill also writes: "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."  I think Americans like to think this way, and act this way, even if we are actually more embedded in social relationships than we sometimes recognize or remember. 

I also point out to students that the individuality that Mill espouses is not a kind of anarchy.  Individuality relies on sociability and public duties. In the introduction he points out:

There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury.

Liberalism, then, is all about balancing individuality against social good.  That balance is dynamic and ever changing, but it never should tilt too far toward the former (a kind of hedonism) or the latter (which could be used to repress individuality). 

Although none of my students had read Mill (and presenting it to them is a minor act of subversion on my part), my sense is that they understand very well the tension between individuality and social order. It is what they live every day here.  Thirty years ago, when I first came to China, there was very little space for individuality.  Now, especially among young people, there is a much wider range of self expression and invention.  Although the society at large is highly competitive - getting into a good college and getting a good job requires extraordinary focus and dedication - there is  a significant amount of personal choice in the social and economic realms.  My students here can move in a variety of different directions in their personal and professional lives. Outside of the classroom (college student tend to be fairly socially conventional) the range of experience is even wider.  As Ci Jiwei argues, there are ways in which the expanding freedom of choice in society and culture and economic life here (though not politics) has already produced "a proto-liberal-democratic society".  Mill would be impressed.

I will be curious to know, in the next few days, what my students think of Mill.  On the one had, the individuality that he supports might well be something they find attractive or, at least, relevant to their lives. The Oxford Handbook describe's his liberal ideology as:

...a means for enabling a full scale individual flourishing, celebrating the interior life of individuals in a form that owed much to Romanticism, with individuals ceasing to be simple maximizers of their own interests and becoming choosing agents, seeking always to improve their lives by shaping their own response to the external environment. (334)

That final phrase about becoming choosing agents seeking to improve their own lives is consistent with descriptions of the "post 90s" generation, of which my students are apart.

So maybe Mill is quite relevant in China now.  But I would be remiss if I did not mention one rather large obstacle in his writing: the rather direct 19th century racism that is still to be found there. Specifically, Mill assumes that genuine individuality relies upon a certain type of rationality born of modern education and social understanding.  He is quite straightforward in saying that the colonized people of his time do not have that capacity yet and, therefore, should not be expected to fully appreciate and exercise the liberty he holds dear.  Perhaps the most damning line is this one: "...we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage."

In other words, Indians and Chinese and Africans are as socially immature as children - "barbarians" he goes on to say - for whom "despotism is a legitimate mode of government."  It would be hard to find a stronger apology for imperialist aggression.

In presenting Mill to my students, I did not shy away from this passage.  My feeling is that they should see liberalism in its full history, including its relationship to racism and imperialism.  I did point out that, whatever its faults, liberalism could well provide conceptual tools to overcome at least some of its failings, as has been the case in the civil rights movement in the US, as well as with the recent consolidation of the right to same sex marriage.  And I also pointed out a parallel dynamic in the contemporary revival of Confucianism, which requires a rejection of its past use as a tool to repress women.  But in the end I leave it to them to decide whether whatever might be useful and true in liberalism can be detached from what has been ugly and repressive.

I was especially attuned to the tensions and contradictions of Mill in China because I re-read the introduction while sitting in the beautiful Garden of Harmonious Pleasures at the Summer Palace in Beijing.  On the one hand, it is a place that dramatically demonstrates the pernicious history of liberalism: it was burnt down by an Anglo-French force in 1860, one year after the publication of On Liberty.  The imperialist arrogance that brought destruction to this ethereal garden was essentially ratified by Mill's racism.  On the other hand, as I sat under a willow tree I watched as dozens of Chinese tourists ambled along the banks of the lotus-filled pond.  And I noticed how many of them, in their choice of clothes and cameras and iphones and other icons of consumer society were fashioning their own unique individualities within the limits of liberty afforded them in today's China.  When I left, and walked through a parking lot filled with Jaguars and Range Rovers and BMWs and Mercedes, I wondered again if these commodities are a proxy of sort, the most available means here now for choosing agents, seeking always to improve their lives by shaping their own response to the external environment, to make the most of their individuality.

Thoughts on Yu Ying-shih's brief reflection on "Confucianism's Kiss of Death"

Thanks to Yaxue Cao on Twitter, I came upon some recent brief remarks by the eminent scholar Yu Ying-shih on the current revival of Confucianism in the PRC that had popped up on Weixin (wonder if it was taken down....).  The title of the post is: 余英时：大陆提倡儒家是儒家的死亡之吻, which runs something like: "Yu Ying-shih: The Confucianism Promoted on the Mainland is Confucianism's Kiss of Death." 

Yu is a long time critic of the CCP regime in the PRC.  Thus, it is unsurprising that his comments express a certain skepticism regarding how Confucianism might be used there now. I share a good deal of that skepticism, but I would raise a question with one aspect of Yu's approach.

First, his critique, which is captured in this line: 中国历史上向来就有两个[儒家]，一个是被迫害的儒家，一个是迫害人的儒家, which translates as: "In Chinese history there have been two [types of] 'Confucianisms,' one is the Confucianism that has been persecuted, the other is the Confucianism that has persecuted people."  The latter is what he refers to as "institutional Confucianism" - 制度性的儒家- the use of Confucian ideas by the state to rationalize authoritarian rule.  He points out that this was a powerful trend throughout Chinese history, but that it is not, to his mind, "genuine Confucianism"  (真正的儒家).  A more genuine Confucianism must embrace a high degree of critical consciousness - 高度批判精神.  Though in these very brief remarks he does not elaborate, I believe what he means here is a kind of moral autonomy, and a corresponding degree of freedom, to be able to make particular judgments about right action in very specific circumstances beyond the reach of the state.  Current political conditions in the PRC constrain such autonomy and genuine Confucianism is obstructed there.  Thus, for Confucianism to be revived in a context where its most genuine expression is impossible is the "kiss of death" - 死亡之吻 - for Confucianism.

I agree with analysis, as I have similarly argued here. 

There is one aspect of Yu's discussion, however, that I find problematic.  He goes on to argue that genuine Confucianism is compatible with democracy and human rights as they are understood in modern times, which again I agree with.  But then he asserts that ancient China had significant expressions of democracy and human rights as universal values.  He invokes, among others, Kang Youwei to argue that China of the "three dynasties" - Xia, Shang, and Zhou - was democratic: 所以康有为也就认为三代以上我们中国的制度是民主的...

I know what Yu is doing here.  He is trying to resist the pro-authoritarian argument that China has never had a significant historical experience with democracy, that the very idea of democracy is a product of Western imperialism, and, therefore, the only culturally appropriate political system for China is some form of authoritarianism.  This is a classic non sequitur, since democracy, as it is currently understood and practiced around the world, is very much a modern phenomenon and, while there are certain conceptual precursors, did not come into its own anywhere until the 19th and 20th centuries (remember: women got the right to vote nationally in the US only in 1920; and blacks were politically excluded for much longer).  This sort of false argument is quite common, and Yu knows he is up against it: his work is banned in the PRC.

But I think Yu's effort in this regard in ineffective both historically and politically.  Historically, it may be true that there are certain proto-democratic ideas in ancient China, most notably in Mencius.  Be that as it may, there is lots and lots of Chinese history that pushes in the other direction.  The imperial state was not democratic and "universal human rights," as they are contemporaneously understood, were not firmly rooted in the culture nor protected by political institutions.  I don't think Yu can win the "but China was democratic back in the day" argument.  

Furthermore, in political terms, reaching back to deep Chinese history will not overcome the authoritarian-nationalist position arrayed against Yu.  Better to concede the historical point and focus on modernity.

China now is not what China was in imperial times.  Too much has changed materially and socially and culturally.  Everyone agrees on this. The CCP is a party of modernization; it's most horrible actions, such as the man-made Great Leap Famine, were attempts to accelerate Chinese modernization.  Deng Xiaoping was a modernizer.  And modernization creates a very different China, just as it creates a very different America (compared to, say, the America of 1850), a very different Japan, a very different India.  And that creative destructive transformation does not stop.  That's what modernity is.

As such, the "moral crisis" that China now faces, that seems to necessitate a reconnection with its Confucian past, is not a function of Western imperialism.  It is the culmination of over 150 years of Chinese modernization.  Yes, imperialism started that process (we will leave Max Weber out of this), but China has been rid of imperialism since at least 1949 and the CCP has been very much in control of how modernization has transpired there.  The internal generation of calls for democracy and human rights are not a nefarious plot by "hostile foreign forces."  Rather, they are predictable and inescapable elements of modernization (I am not arguing that modernization is a singular process that unfolds along the same course everywhere; rather, I hold to a complex and pluralistic understanding of modernization as here).

Long story short, for those who want to argue that Confucianism, genuinely and autonomously critical Confucianism, is compatible with Chinese modernity, do not need to argue against the "imposition of 'Western' values" canard that authoritarian apologists are so quick to invoke.  Modernization is not simply "Westernization."  The "West" was not the "West" before modernity; and the "West" is constantly transforming within modernity, influenced incessantly by the experience of modernity in the "East".  China, too, is transforming, and the combination of economic and political and social and cultural practices and institutions that constitute Chinese modernity at any particular moment will obviously be different than the formations of, say, American modernity.

There is, therefore, no deep historical experience that might ultimately authorize genuine Confucianism in China.  Confucianism was viciously struggled against by Mao and it now faces a wholly unique modernizing context.  Whatever Confucianism might be in contemporary China, genuine or not, will not be what it was in the 19th century.  And the main thing standing in the way of the emergence of genuine Confucianism in China, as Yu reminds us, is the continuing authoritarian power of the CCP.  As long as that power remains unchanged, the prospects for a Confucianism of a high degree of critical consciousness in China are oppressive.

China Still Not Gaining Soft Power in US

China went large at the recent Book Expo America in New York but, for the most part, American readers did not notice.  Maybe they were turned off by marketing language like this: "provides visually perceptive materials for education in patriotism and safeguarding national interests."  Not quite NYT Bestseller list stuff there.

The book bust is symptomatic of a larger problem for Zhongnanhai: even though the powers-that-be extoll the strategic importance of building Chinese "soft power," there is very little evidence in the US that the PRC is gaining in cultural attractiveness. 

A quick aside here: I am generally skeptical about the efficacy of soft power.  My sense is that Joseph Nye's analysis is not much more than a thinly veiled recycling of "American exceptionalism," and, moreover, insofar as the Sino-US relationship is concerned, the "hard power" dynamics of island dredging in the South China Sea and epic hacking of Office of Personnel Management data are much more significant in shaping American perceptions than are popular cultural flows. But it doesn't matter what I think.  Xi Jinping thinks China needs soft power and, by damn it, he's going to work hard to gin up some Chinese soft power. 

From what I can tell, however, there hasn't been much success, at least as far as the US is concerned.

Quick: what was the last great movie made in the PRC that you saw? Haven't been keeping up with the Tiny Times series?  That's OK, they're pretty bad.  Of course, Cannes regular Jia Zhangke creates marvelous films, but his work is regularly banned in his home country and he has become a symbol of the anxious censorship that disrupts so much creative art in China.  And that's the point: in the realm of popular culture the biggest obstacle to the development of Chinese soft power is the heavy hand of the Chinese government.

Now it might be the case that Chinese popular culture is attractive to some people in some countries.  A (pay walled) smart analysis of soft power reminds us that attractiveness varies from one target audience to another: what North Koreans find alluring might turn off Norwegians.  Seems obvious, but too many discussions of soft power assume that it is a unitary thing that can be easily isolated and measured.  It's really quite variable and vague.  Safe to say, though, that there has yet to be a significant breakthrough for PRC popular culture in the US.  Nothing to match, say, the British Invasion, or Jogo Bonito or even Hello Kitty. 

Much the same can be said about higher education.  Colleges and universities may be the biggest generators of US soft power.  In the 2013-2014 academic year 274,000 PRC students were enrolled in US colleges; only 14,000 Americans did the reverse.  The disproportion here is well beyond population differences, or even differences in domestic higher education enrollments.  For many Chinese, gaining a degree from a foreign university is a coveted goal.  And the US ranks at the top of the most desired locations.  They come, their families pay their way often with no financial aid, even if they are ill prepared.

Of course, not all Chinese students in the US embrace American values.  The experience for some might reinforce their perceptions of deficiencies in American culture and politics, a kind of reverse anti-soft power.  But many are positively influenced, and increasing numbers are quite literally attracted to the US for purposes of education.

The 14,000 or so American students in China (most of whom are there for one year study abroad opportunities as opposed to multiple year degree programs) come away with more positive attitudes toward the PRC.  The good feelings, however, are  generated mostly by personal friendships with Chinese people.  American students are turned off by government censorship and pollution and other facets of life in the PRC.  At my own college, several students turned down post graduate fellowships to China because they did not want to return to crowded, sooty Beijing. Other evidence suggests that American students more generally are losing interest in study abroad programs in China.

Needless to say, the current ideological tightening on PRC campuses will further reduce the attractiveness of Chinese college for American students.

On the language learning front, English is required in Chinese schools from at least the sixth grade onward. Conversely, although Chinese language instruction is gaining ground in American high schools, at the college level enrollments are leveling off.

Confucius Institutes are not going to close the language gap nor improve PRC soft power prospects.  Following the closings of programs at the University of Chicago and Penn State, and the critical report by the AAUP, many American academics are now wary of potential political ramifications of a Confucius Institute.  Those places that do sponsor CIs do so for the money: the PRC covers a good portion of the cost for a basic language program. Thus, the institutes are more a matter of inducement than attractiveness.  And the inducement is now colored by political concern.

Overall, I'm just not seeing it.  There does not seem to be much increase in China's soft power in the US.  Perhaps I'm missing something, and I would welcome evidence to the contrary.

On the other hand, it may be that China is playing a different soft power game than the one suggested by Nye.  William Callahan puts forth a notion of "negative soft power ."  (pay walled) It might be that the key target audience for PRC cultural diplomacy is not people in the US but people in China.  Instead of creating attractive popular cultural and educational products, the more important goal might be to demonstrate how "American values" are an existential threat to China and Chinese culture.  Thus, when US academics criticize Confucius Institutes, the regime can present this to a Chinese audience as just another example of American narrow-mindedness and ingratitude for the altruistic efforts of the wise Party leadership.  The goal, then, is not to increase the attractiveness of Chinese culture in America, but to weaken the attractiveness of American culture in China.

An interesting idea. And it would reinforce my general sense that Chinese soft power is not on the rise in the US.

Why the Seahawks Lost

What a crazy conclusion to the Super Bowl!  A circus catch followed by perhaps the worst play call in the history of the game.  Wow.  

And it looks like both Sunzi and the Yi Jing got it wrong.  But not quite.  Let's look again at what those texts suggested.

My Sunzi analysis pointed to the key match up being the Seattle offense versus the New England defense and that, indeed, is what the game came down to.  At the critical moment, however, the Hawks lost sight of their strength.  Instead of doing what virtually the entire country was expecting, run "beast mode" into the end zone, they threw a quick pass over the middle into traffic.  Apparently, they were trying to use the clock, which seems absurd with only 20 seconds left.  If that was the case they were violating a key Sunzi principle: always go for the quick victory.  They had three downs, two time outs, and the best rushing offense in the game.  In essence, they forgot who they were, they failed to "understand yourself," and thus they lost.

The Hawks defense gave up more points than I expected, or should we say the Pats offense scored more than they had in past Super Bowls against stout defenses.  But the Seattle defense ultimately did what they had to do: they put their offense in a position to win the game.

Just like back in 2007, the terms of the Sunzi analysis were correct.  But the Seahawks failed to maintain their focus on key Sunzi ideas: know your strengths, go for the quick victory.

As for the Yi Jing, friends of mine who work with the text more than I sometimes remind me: the Yi is never wrong, but we sometimes fail to fully understand it.

In my case, I focused too much on the "supreme success" indicated by hexagram 17, "following," toward which conditions were tending.  And conditions were tending in that direction.  The Kearse catch seemed to illustrate how the Hawks were aligned with Dao: fate was working for them.

But then they lost track of themselves.  Here is what I said at the end of the post: "if they are able to stay within the particular dynamics of the game and exploit their inherent strengths, they are going to come out on top."

This is precisely what they failed to do in the last 20 seconds; they did not "exploit their inherent strengths."  They were distracted by other concerns, and thus they failed.

If we look back to hexagram 44, "Coming to Meet," the nine in the third place has a commentary that warns of "painful indecision in behavior:" 

But if we gain clear insight into the danger of the situation, we shall at least avoid more serious mistakes.

That is what did not happen.  The Hawks lost sight of the danger of throwing a short pass over the middle into traffic on the goal line when the defense was generally cheating forward. 

It's sad, really.  So close yet frustrated.  Such is the folly of humanity, and why we need to keep consulting the old books to continually learn how to act according to the natural unfolding of Dao.

An Yi Jing Super Bowl Prediction: Seahawks Win!

Following up on my Sunzi Super Bowl analysis, I thought it might be good to consult the Yi Jing about the outcome of tomorrow's big game. This was made easier last evening by a group of friends who urged me to ask the oracle: "Will the Seahawks win?"  We were all at a local bar and the atmosphere was a bit boisterous.  But through the talk and laughter, an answer came into view: the Seahawks will, indeed, win.

I realize, since this is also the conclusion of my Sunzi analysis, that a Seahawks victory now appears overdetermined.  But, as the commentary below illustrates, things could go wrong for Seattle.  It will be a battle.  If, however, they do what the Yi Jing suggests, they will prevail.

The first hexagram I received from the Yi was 44, Kou, "Coming to Meet," with four - yes, count them, four! - moving lines, in the first, second, third, and ninth places, thus tending in the direction of, Sui, hexagram 17, "Following::

                                                         

                                   ====> 

 

 

Let's start with 44.  The broken yin line at the bottom is a key: it suggests a principle of darkness or weakness or inferiority rising up into a time of light and strength and superiority.  A kind of conflict or contention, or dare we say football game, is implied: strong v. weak.  Since I asked directly about the Seahawks, we could assume that the "strong," "light," "superior" force here is the Seattle team.  If that is the case, a struggle is foreseen. The Judgment ("Coming to meet. The maiden is powerful. One should not marry such a maiden") gets at the inherent danger when yang meets yin.  And the Image ("Under heaven, wind: The image of Coming to Meet.  Thus does the prince act when disseminating his command and proclaiming them to the four quarters of heaven") suggests that a leader (a quarterback calling plays?) must take command to manage the dangers of the opposing force.  And notice: the leader must be on his game for "four quarters."

Some more interesting points come in the line statements.  The six in the first place implies that the Seattle defense must play strong:

It [Pats offense?] must be checked with a brake of bronze.  Perseverance brings good fortune.  If one lets it [Pats offense] take its course, one experiences misfortune.  Even a lean pig has it in him to rage around.

The course of the Pats offense cannot be allowed to proceed unchecked.  The Hawks D has to persevere.  It is tempting to see the "lean pig" as a deflated football(!!!).  But maybe it is a warning not to take the Pats too lightly, which Seattle certainly will not do.

The rather gruesome image in the third line could point to an injury that might disrupt the Seahawks plans:

There is no skin on his thighs, and walking comes hard.  If one is mindful of the danger, no great mistake is made.

Whatever happens, they have to keep their heads, stick to the game plan, persevere through it all, even if an apparently significant injury takes a player out of the game.

The sixth line is rather foreboding:

He comes to meet with his horns. Humiliation.  No blame.

Wilhelm's commentary gives us this insight into this line: "There are many people who in a noble pride hold themselves aloof from all that is low and rebuff it brusquely wherever it comes to meet them.  Such persons are reproached for being proud and distant..."   Sounds like Marshawn Lynch and his dealings with the press... But, seriously, the invocation of humiliation could point a bad situation for the Seahawks.  The reason why I think that something better is in the offing for them is hexagram 17, the condition toward which things are tending.

The Judgment for "Following" is very favorable:

Following has supreme success. Perseverance furthers. No blame.

It is all about adaptation. If the Hawks do not try to force things, if they take what circumstances allow, if they follow the natural unfolding of the game, they will prevail.  

Here's what all of this suggests:  the game will be a close struggle, the forces of dark and light fighting it out.  The Pats might gain the upper hand early; the Hawks may suffer a significant injury and be trailing at halftime.  To win, the Seahawks will have to keep their heads, maintain their defensive strength, and adjust offensively at halftime.  If they are able to stay within the particular dynamics of the game and exploit their inherent strengths, they are going to come out on top: "supreme success."  And then Russell Wilson will be able to walk off the field toward a restful night, just as hexagram 17 says:

Thus the superior man at nightfall goes indoors for rest and recuperation.

Go Hawks!