The Useless Tree

A Sunzi Super Bowl Analysis and Prediction: Seahawks 21, Patriots 17

It has been a long while since I have attempted a Sunzi Super Bowl assessment.  My first foray was back in 2007 and, while the terms of the analysis were quite useful, my ultimate prediction came up short (damn you, Rex Grossman).  The next year I did not venture a specific prognostication, but my Sunzi-guided investigation yielded this insight: "...the Giants will have to exploit their [Patriots] attention there [on Plaxico Burris] and find other receiver options. "

Of course, no one could have foreseen that the ultimate "other receiver option" would turn out to be David Tyree, but Sunzi pointed me in that direction.

So it seems clear that Sunzi can be applied to football predictions, and that is precisely what I did in my class - a short course on Sunzi and its various applications - today.  The analysis yielded this outcome: Seahawks 21, Patriots 17.

The first step in using Sunzi to think about football is that which I took back in 2007:

 ....attack weaknesses, avoid strengths.  When we consider the strengths and weaknesses of each side we notice that the Colts' strength, their offense, is matched by the Bears' strength, their defense.  Thus, the best strategy for each side is not to expect the winning strike to come from that particular area.  The Colts offense will move the ball and score points; but the Bears' defense will come up with some big stops.  We have to assume that the Colts will score somewhere in the neighborhood of 28 points.  The Bears will not stop them completely, though they might limit them at key moments.  For all of its potency, however, the Colts offense will not be the key to the game.

 The crucial factors will be the weaknesses of each side: the Bears' offense and the Colts defense.  The team that holds the edge here, that is able to exploit the opponent's weakness, will have the advantage. 

Remember: the Colts actually scored 29 points that year...

But what about now?  It seems to me that the Seahawks defense is their greatest strength and the Patriots offense is their greatest strength.  Since Sunzi tells us that strength versus strength is unlikely to be the central dynamic of a strategic interaction, we need to contemplate how the Seahawks offense matches up against the Patriots defense.  But before getting to that, let's recall that when a strong Patriots offense (undefeated in 2008) twice matched up with a strong NY Giants defense, Tom Brady could only manage to score 14 points (2008) and 17 points (2012).  My sense is that the Seahawks defense is at least as good, if not better, than those Giants defenses, so we can reasonably expect that the Patriots will not exceed 17 points of offense.

But that is not the key confrontation.  I'm not alone in this way of thinking.  Here is Greg A. Bedard over at Sports Illustrated: "The Super Bowl matchup will hinge on the Seattle offense against the New England defense..."  His focus is correct, according to Sunzi, but his conclusions are wrong: he sees the Patriots winning 16 to 13 (notice that he, too, does not expect the Patriots to exceed their past performances against the Giants).  Now, granted, this is a very closely matched contest.  Things could hinge on a trick play or a fumble or the bounce of the ball.  But here is why Bedard is wrong and the Seahawks will score at least three touchdowns.

Seattle had the best rushing offense in the league during the regular season (New England was 18th).  Marshawn Lynch is, of course, a "beast."  He, alone, would cause the Pats fits.  But Seattle also runs the read option, and the Pats do not see this all that often; they are not used to having to account simultaneously for both an outstanding tail back and a smart and fast quarterback-as-running-threat.  Yes, they will have practiced it all week long (when not worrying about how they will be able to survive without deflating their footballs) but that is not the same as actually facing it.  

Handling the varied run options that Seattle brings will create problems for the Patriots secondary.  While it is true that Seattle was a lowly 26th in total receiving yards (Pats were 11th) when you look at average yards per reception the Hawks jump up to 8th (Pats were a much less impressive 25th). We all know what these comparisons illustrate: the Pats rely heavily on the short pass (which they will have more trouble completing against the Hawks tight, pressing coverage) while the Seahawks utilize the run more.  But when they do pass, Seattle passes longer because defenses are cheating forward to try to stop the run.  I do not think the Pats secondary is good enough (18th in defending against the pass; a stat where Hawks are number 1) to be able to counter the inevitable onslaught.

It is still a close call.  The Pats have some good players. Gronk may score a touchdown.  But on the straight match up, the Hawks have the edge.  As Sunzi might say: their weaker point (offense) is stronger than the Pats weaker point (defense).

Both sides will try trick plays, and this is perfectly in keeping with Sunzi, too.  From chapter 5 of the Bingfa:

凡戰者，以正合，以奇勝。

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

Instead of Giles's translation of zheng (正) as "direct" and qi (奇) as "indirect," we might go with "orthodox" and "unorthodox."  The implication is the same, however: whichever side can pull off a surprise, an unorthodox trick play, could come away with a victory.

So, I think the Seahawks will win.  They should win on the head to head competition.  But if they fail to pull it off, it may well be due to some ruse that Belichick and company pull.

Let's end with a warm memory: 

Thinking Strategically about the Hong Kong Demonstrations

An interesting day in HK today (and this may change at any time, given the fluid nature of the situation).  The government had said that the protesters must leave by Monday morning, with an implicit threat of force.  The movement responded by allowing access to government buildings, thus facilitating a return to some normalcy, while still maintaining their presence.  Each side has thus made a demand (earlier, protesters had called for the resignation of the CE, which did not happen) that has not been heeded by the other and the situation has settled into a stalemate, while both parties circle each other warily, preparing for negotiations.

What, then, should be the longer term strategy of the movement?  This kind of question is hotly debated now among protest organizers, who are in a difficult spot: they want to gain something tangible for the activists who have been out on the street for over a week, but they must be careful not to push too far and lose sympathy of the wider community.  A tricky situation.

I will not second guess choices made by the leadership of the movement (just as I am loath to "blame the students" for the 1989 protests in Beijing), because I respect the difficulties they face in terms of political management and communications.  They are in a position of relative weakness against the state (here defined as not just the HK government but also the PRC apparatus that stands behind it).  But let me offer some thoughts drawn from Sunzi.

Chapter VI, "Weaknesses and Strengths" (Griffith trans.) seems particularly apt here. One key concept is "shape" or "form" - 型.  Sunzi points out that the shape of one's army, its physical appearance on the battlefield and its ascertainable form (ascertainable, that is, by the adversary's surveillance) is a critical strategic variable:

The ultimate in disposing of one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape.  Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you (6.24)

By settling into quasi-permanent positions, the HK demonstrators are taking on a certain shape, and that could make it easier for the government to counter them.  Rather than static defense of particular locations, Sunzi suggests a shape more like water:

Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strengths and strikes weaknesses.

As as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.

As as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. (6.27-29)

The HK movement may want to consider a more fluid dynamic for its actions.  Melting away from current positions could allow for a significant flow into other areas, where the government and police least expect it.  Then, as the government responds, another shift in strategic shape could open up a new area for action. 

Notice above that Sunzi mentions avoiding strengths and striking weaknesses.  This is an important aspect of chapter 6, as here:

To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack.

Therefore, against those skilled in attack, an enemy does not know where to defend; against experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack. (6.7-8).

Now, it must be said that the protests in Hong Kong are not a battle in a military sense.  The protesters are not attempting to overthrow the government, but simply trying to pressure it for a specific political change: an open nomination process for the next CE election.  The PRC government is unlikely to give in on that goal, but if the demonstrators can keep up the pressure, play a longer strategic game, they could influence the composition of the nominating committee or create conditions for a change in the nomination process in the future.

Thus, it is important to have a longer term strategy, and that is what Sunzi offers above.  At present, the demonstrators are occupying a location that the government wants to attack: most notably in Admiralty.  It might be smart to yield that ground and flow into a place that the government does not protect.  I'm not sure what that place wouldb be, but I'm sure the leaders of the movement would have ideas.  If the government then shifts to defend an area it is not thinking of defending, that could open up other opportunities for short term occupations.  The point, again, is moving and shaping one's self in a manner that keeps the adversary off balance. 

If that sort of fluid approach is taken, another large scale demonstration could be possible in the not too distant future:

The emeny must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places.  And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight [against] in any one place will be few. (6.14)

The point here is to maximize the strategic possibilities for a movement that, in material terms, is relatively weak.   If Hong Kong people want to shape their political future, they must continue to press their claims, they must play the long game.  And Sunzi provides some ideas for how to do that.   He even waxes poetic when thinking about an apparently insurmountable adversary:

Of the five elements, none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes. (6.31)

Sunzi: Against US action in Syria

The impending US strike against Syria brings Sunzi to mind.

On the face of it, it appears to be a failure of strategy and policy.  The most famous aphorism from Sunzi is 3.3 (from the Griffith translation; Chinese from China Text Project):

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

是故百戰百勝，非善之善者也；不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也

But this hardly exhausts what Sunzi might contribute to the matter. In a personal communication the other day, a military historian remarked that Sunzi is perhaps the most problematic of the classic texts on strategy because it suggests that victory is possible without doing the hard work of actually fighting.  This is, to my mind, an incomplete critique. The famous win-without-fighting idea describes a best case scenario, and it orients strategic thinking to broader contextual and longer-term thinking. The text also has much to say about how to go about the hard work of actually fighting if the best case scenario is unattainable.

And that is very much what the Syrian situation is now. From a realist perspective, It is hard to see a good outcome in terms of US foreign policy.  Regime change could very much turn against US interests: a reconstituted Syrian state could take on an even more anti-American posture than Assad.  But a victorious Assad might also pose more problems for the US than he has in the past. Thus, any use of US force will have to be limited because decisively tipping the military balance in one direction or the other is not necessarily in US interests.  And that seems to be what Obama and his military planners have in mind: impose a discrete punishment on Assad for using chemical weapons.

But it is not at all clear what that will accomplish, either.  It may mark certain kinds of actions - use of chemical weapons - as out of bounds.  But Assad was hanging on without relying of such actions.  It might assauge some sense of moral outrage. But if it does not really impact the military balance, then it does nothing to forestall more morally reprehensible actions in the future.  What if next week, after US airstrikes, Assad's forces kill twice the number of innocents by conventional means.  Will the US bomb again?   As long as the horrible civil war grinds on, there will be no end of moral outrages.

So, it is hard to see what will be gained by bombing Syria. And innocents might be killed in the process, which becomes the ultimate reason to oppose it.

But what would Sunzi do? 

Although he certainly values economy (i.e. not using more force nor killing more people than necessary), and counsels speed and avoidance of protracted warfare, he also recognizes that some situations favor an offensive strike (Chinese source):

One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.

守則不足，攻則有餘

Compared with Syria at this point, the US is certainly in the position to attack. And that attack can unfold as Sunzi expects:

    ...those skilled in attack move as from above the ninefold heavens.

善攻者，動于九天之上

That is pretty much how the US will do it: from the air.

But the key question is: what should be attacked? Simply deciding between bombing Syria's remaiing chemical weapons capability or taking a somewhat wider approach to degrading its military forces is, from Sunzi's point of view, inadequate. The use of force must be strategically oriented:

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war it to attack the enemy's strategy:

故上兵伐謀

What is Assad's strategy? Survival is his most likely priority.  But, as mentioned above, the US cannot really attack that because his fall is not necessarily the best outcome for the Us. Thus, as long as the longer-term strategic interests of the US remain uncertain, there is no real rationale for an attack of any sort.

Just because the US has the offensive advantage and can attack does not mean that it strategically should attack. Sunzi's ultimate advice to Obama in this circumstance would be:

If not in the interest of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight.

非利不動，非得不用，非危不戰

Zero Dark Sunzi

I saw "Zero Dark Thirty" last night, a bracing film.  I am also reading Sunzi with my students here; so, it seems quite natural for me to bring these two texts together.

As a movie, "Zero Dark Thirty" is quite good: absorbing story-telling; persuasive cinematography; some taut performances.  But I agree with those, most notably Steve Coll, who argue that its claim to verisimilitude sends it into politically problematic territory: the film exaggerates the role of torture in the capture of bin Laden, Also, its ambiguity toward torture, which might reflect something in the historical moment, leaves open a justification for its continuing use. The film-makers are attempting to walk a fine line between journalism and fiction, but by intimating the former they assume a responsibility for the political interpretation of the film that might not attach to a fuller embrace of fiction.

But what would Sunzi think?  At first, he would agree that torture should be generally eschewed.  He straightforwardly states, in 2.19 (Griffith translation): "Treat captives well, and care for them."  To which Chang Yu, a later commentator, adds: "All soldiers taken must be cared for with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us."  Not much ambiguity there.

Notice, too, in chapter 13, "Employment of Secret Agents," (13.17) he states:

It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to serve you.  Given them instructions and care for them. Thus double agents are recruited and used.

Something like this failed spectacularly in the movie, when the apparent double agent blows himself up at Camp Chapman.  But the possibility of such failure does not lead Sunzi to accept the costs associated with torture.

It might be argued that the importance that Sunzi places on "foreknowledge"  and intelligence could offer a limited rationale for torture.  He accepts the necessity of killing a secret agent who might prematurely divulge information to the enemy (13.15):

If plans relating to secret operations are prematurely divulged the agent and all those to whom he spoke of them shall be put to death

Rough treatment,indeed. But this applies to spies working for you, not to detainees you have captured from the enemy. And execution for a breech of military discipline is not the same as torture. Sunzi recognizes the crucial importance of good and full intelligence, but he shies away from an explicit endorsement of torture as a means of intelligence-gathering, even though we might assume such practices were known to him in his own time.

It might be the case that Sunzi would tolerate a momentary, exceptional breech of his general treat-prisoners-well stance.  But that is not what US policy was during the Bush administration. Torture was routinized and systematized and bureaucratized.  It was not the exception but an established practice. As Coll points out, we do not know how widely it was actually used, because so much information remains classified, but we do know that Bush's lawyers laid the legal basis for regular use of torture by US agencies.  And that is what must be struggled against.  Sunzi, too, would reject the way in which Bush tried to normalize torture, reducing it to a banal evil.

One aspect of the movie that Sunzi would applaud is the more mundane and prosaic practice of intelligence gathering.  A woman searching through old files make a key connection that mattered.   A host of neighborhood spies painstakingly chart the movements of bin Laden's courier to finally locate the house where he is living. That sort of detailed knowledge of local conditions and possibilities - the shape of the battlefield, as it were - is very much in keeping with Sunzi thinking: "Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground." (7.11)

As to whether, ultimately, it was worth it to kill bin Laden, Sunzi might agree that it was.  He tells us that our strategy should be aimed at attacking the enemy's strategy (3.4).   A commentator, Li Ch'uan, adds a story to illustrate this point.  It recounts how a general agree to talks with an envoy of his adversary.  Presumably, it was understood that such an envoy would be granted safe passage.  But the general, K'ou Hsun, killed him.  When asked by his staff why he did it, he replied that the envoy was the enemy leader's "heart and guts, his intimate counsellor.  If I had spared [the envoy's] life, he would have accomplished his schemes, but when I killed him [the enemy leader] lost his guts."

A similar logic may have applied to bin Laden and al Qaeda: to rob the organization of its "heart and guts" could effectively counter its strategy.

Romney, Bain, and Sunzi

James Fallows reflects upon the Obama campaign's current line of attack against Mitt Romney's past experience at Bain Capital h/t: Sullivan).  He writes that the effort is reminiscent of the "swiftboating" of John Kerry in 2004:

The effect of this kind of 'Swiftboating' is, as I pointed out, to change a candidate's presumed strength into his weakness, or vulnerability. The term's origin is of course the 2004 general election campaign, when falsehood-filled accounts of John Kerry's record (as a Swift boat naval officer in Vietnam) turned what he presumed would be a strength, his military record, into something he had to defend and explain. Long before the Swift boat episode, this jiujutsu technique was a specialty of Karl Rove's.

But I wonder if Romney's business experience at Bain is really a presumed strength.  I suspect the Obama people are seeing it as a weakness, an emblem of Romney the rich guy out of touch with the average economically struggling American Joe in Ohio or Wisconsin or Pennsylvania.  As such, the Obama organization is not attacking Romney's strength but exploiting his weakness.... just as Sunzi would tell us.

In Chapter VI of The Art of War, aptly entitled "Weaknesses and Strengths," Sunzi frames the strategic situation in these terms (6.7):

To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack.

This gets at the Obama campaign strategy.  Bain is an issue that the Romney campaign has not protected well.  It appears, at best, to be ambiguous: he has said that he left his CEO duties in 1999, but in other statements and legal filings has created the impression that he still held the title after that time.  This kind of ambiguity does not play well in a presidential campaign.  Thus, the Romney people have just tried to avoid the issue.  They have not developed, pre-emptively, an effective defense.  Indeed, they are further hampered by Romney's reluctance to release more of his tax returns, which further creates the impression of a rich guy taking advantage of high-end loopholes and off-shore opportunities, all rather Bain-like, that are simply beyond the rest of us.

The Obama people sense Romney's vulnerabiilty on these issues -  a vulnerability that had been revealed in the earlier Republican primary - and they have moved to attack what has not been protected.

To some degree, Obama is also following Sunzi's defensive advice: he is defending what Romney cannot attack: health insurance reform.  Romney's offensive capability on this issue is obviously limited, given his own experience in Massachusetts.

Of course, the campaign is larger and more complex than these issues.  But Sunzi does offer some insight into the strategic back and forth.  Let's end with this passage (6.27):

Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.

Sunzi and Soft Power

I guess when you get quoted in The Economist you should post a link to the story.  And so, here it is: Sun Tzu and the art of soft power. (I don't appear until about 2/3 of the way down).

The gist of the piece is that China has been barking up the wrong soft power tree (so to speak) in its attempts to develop Confucianism into a soft power resource:

But Confucius is problematic. Mao and his colleagues regarded Confucius’s philosophy as the ideological glue of the feudal system they destroyed; and so attempts to promote him are vulnerable to the growing split in the Communist Party. In January, with great fanfare, the National History Museum unveiled a bronze statue of him standing 9.5 metres (31 feet) high in front of its entrance by Tiananmen Square. Three months later the statue was quietly removed. The sage’s appearance so close to the most hallowed ground of Chinese communism had outraged hardliners. They saw it as an affront to Mao, whose giant portrait hung diagonally opposite.

As regular readers of The Useless Tree (both of you) know, I have pressed this argument further, and anyone interested in just how far I press it can look at this post on "Why Confucianism will not provide 'soft power' to the PRC" 

I also think The Economist piece gets it right on Sunzi.  Generally, Sunzi is easier to integrate into contemporary modernist and post-modernist political and social practices.  Indeed, it has already been so integrated, as evidenced by its invocation in business and military and political and, even, dating books (I haven't read it - obviously - but I'm sure Confucianism will not produce a title quite like this: The Art of War for Dating: Master Sun Tzu's Tactics To Win Over Women).  This may seem frivolous but I think that "soft power" cultural resources have to be flexible and popular and fun to create the kind of "attractiveness" that the notion implies.  And, long story short, that is a big part of the reason why Confucianism is just not working as a source of soft power: it is too serious and demanding.  

But Sunzi, as the article suggests, poses a problem for the PRC's soft power strategy, because it does not project the image of China that Party propagantists want to project.  Notice these line:

Sun Tzu may have written about stratagems for warfare, but Huimin’s [in Shandong province] assembled scholars prefer to tout him as a peacenik. Their evidence is one of the sage’s best-known insights: “The skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting.” What better proof, say his fans in China, that the country has always loved peace?

Of course Sunzi is not a "peacenik".  He is a military strategist who believed that battles can be avoided if the protagonist has amassed such superior power and strategic positioning that the adversary simply recognizes the futility of a fight.  It is a very "hard power" calculation.  But the idea that China has "always loved peace" is a political and historical fiction inscribed into contemporary Chinese national identity, and it is a theme that Party and military powerholders find useful in propagating, especially to other regional states, like Vietnam and Japan, that are concerned with the growth of PRC military capabilities. 

Thus the paradox of Sunzi's "soft power:" the strategic vision of Sunzi is widely known and studied and respected, but it creates an image of China as a potentially devious, deceptive (remember, for Sunzi, war, and by Clausewitzian extension, politics, is all about deception) and self-interested power, not quite the picture Beijing wants to paint.  Better to have the avuncular smile of Confucius than the calculating glare of Sunzi...

And here, for posterity, is the textual equivalent of fifteen minutes of Economist fame:

Yet a closer look reveals Sun Tzu’s flaws as a tool of soft power. Chinese attempts to remould him as a man of peace stumble over the fact that his book is a guide to winning wars, avidly studied by America’s armed forces as it was by Mao. Sam Crane of Williams College in Massachusetts says that during the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq he delighted in telling students attending his Sun Tzu classes (some of whom were preparing to join the army) that the “Art of War” advised that prisoners be treated kindly. But, he says, “I think the thing that makes [the book] universal in a grim way is war and competition. War is not a Western construct: the Chinese have been really good at war for a long time.”

Derek Jeter is a Sunzi Warrior, not a Confucian Gentleman

Captain of the New York Yankees, shortstop Derek Jeter, last week feigned that he had been hit by a pitch and was awarded first base.  He hammed it up a bit but, as replays clearly demonstrated, he had not been hit.  Thus he successfully deceived the umpires and gained a momentary advantage for his team (the Yankees went on to ultimately lose the game).

So what?  Well, it seems that some people (I suspect many of them disheartened Red Sox fans...) are calling Jeter a cheater.  His actions, they seem to suggest, fall outside the usual and traditional practices of the game.  But this is not true.  Listen to what life-long baseball people say:

“I cannot understand what the commotion is,” said the Fox baseball broadcaster Tim McCarver, a former major league catcher, as he took stock of the uproar.

“Why question that?” he said of Jeter’s actions. “I can’t believe anyone would say that’s cheating.”

Minnesota Twin's Manager Ron Gardenhire, whose team has lost repeatedly to Jeter’s Yankee's in the post season, agreed.

“You have to be an actor in this game, you have to be,” he said. “It’s unfortunate, but it’s part of the game. Jeter, you could see him staring over there in the video, sly as a cat. It’s just the way it is. Call it what you want to call it, it happens. It’s happened forever.”

As some commentators, along with Gardenhire, have rightly pointed out, deception is a part of virtually all sports (save, perhaps, golf):

Now, about the morality of sport generally and baseball particularly. To begin with, deception is inherent to competition and it is fundamental to games of all types, including hide and seek and chess. (One thing that has gotten buried in the seriousness of the Jeter hoopla is that fooling people can be fun.)

Second, that one player or one team might be interested in putting one over on an opponent is one reason, a big reason, that organized sports have officials — who have no expectation, by the way, that the players are guided by the honor system.

Yes, there is such a thing as good sportsmanship.  But occasional deception does not explode the boundaries of sportsmanship.

Thus, baseball, and professional sports more generally, is something close to the strategic conflict that Sunzi presumes, as opposed to the ideal human-ethical contexts that Confucius theorizes.

It is Sunzi who tells us that "all warfare is based on deception" (I.17).  Winning the battle, and ultimately the war, matter; and in a ruthlessly instrumental manner, actions are judged in terms of how well they help gain that outcome. 

Confucius understands this.  He wards us away from engaging in warfare precisely because he knows that it is a context that corrodes ethical standards.  In a similar vein he also tells us not to get caught up in competitive sports:

The Master said: "The noble-minded never contend.  It's true that archery is a kind of contention.  But even then, they bow and yield to each other when stepping up to the range.  And when they step down, they toast each other.  Even in contention, they retain their nobility. (3.7)

The key here is that gentlemen never contend.  They do not get caught up in the winning or losing.  For Confucius it is all about maintaining proper behavior in all circumstances.  And competitive sports, which by definition require contention, are simply out of bounds.

Confucius shares this dim view of competition with Zhuangzi:

Games of skill and chance begin in a light mood, but they always end up dark and serious.  And if things go far enough, it's nothing but guile.  Drinking at ceremonies begins orderly enough, but it always ends up wild and chaotic.  And if things go far enough, it's nothing but debauchery.  All of our human affairs seem to work like this.  However sincerely they begin, they end up in vile deceit.  And however simply they begin, they grow enormously complex before they're over. (55)

Both Confucius and Zhuangzi (though each in a rather different way) tell us that if we seek to live a good live, we should avoid unnecessary competitive situations.  And they would see competitive sports as unnecessary. 

To bring this back to Jeter (I have written of some of his Confucian qualities here), if we want to condemn him of some sort of significant moral transgression, then we might want to ask ourselves if competitive sports, which are a breeding ground for deception, ought to be outlawed.  Alternatively, if the pleasures of sports are seen as important, and its transgressions relatively inconsequential, then we should not be complaining about a bit of acting by Derek Jeter.

Oh, and by the way: Go Yankees!

Sun Tzu and the World Cup

I've watched a couple of World Cup matches (US/England; Brazil/NK; some of Spain/Switzerland) and Sun Tzu has come to mind....

On first thought, it is a bit difficult to apply Sun Tzu to soccer (football...).  The battle situations that he anticipates are more fluid than a sporting competition.  In soccer there is a very specific, unchanging objective: to score goals (or, conversely, to keep the adversary from scoring goals).  Everyone always knows that the prime objective is.  Thus, it is hard to see how this Sun Tzu idea can translate into soccer strategy:

To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect.  To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack.

Therefore, against those skilled in attack, an enemy does not know where to defend; against experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to defend. VI.7,8.

Everyone knows, ultimately, where the attack will come in soccer: it is aimed quite intently on the goal.  And everyone knows where the defense will be concentrated - at least in those instances where one team is emphasizing the defense.  The field is too restricted, the rules too determinative, to allow for too much in the way of uncertainty about what will be attacked and what will be defended.

But there are Sun Tzu ideas that are more applicable.  This passage, for instance:

Anciently, the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability.

Invincibility depends on one's self; the enemy's vulnerability on him.

It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable.

Therefore, it is said that one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so.

Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack.

One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. IV.1-7.

I think this very well captures the Brazil/NK game and the Spain/Switzerland game.  The North Koreans and the Swiss clearly understood themselves to be the weaker team in their respective competitions.  Their strength was inadequate, so they emphasized defense. In doing so, they were, at the outset, basically conceding an outright victory and were playing for a tie because they had to give up their attack - and, as Sun Tzu notes, the possibility of victory lies in the attack; if you hunker down in search of invincibility you give up the attack, and thus the chance for victory.  In such circumstances, not losing takes precedence over winning.

Sun Tzu would thus approve of the NK and Swiss strategies.

Things turned out better for the Swiss because the Spanish made themselves vulnerable.  Their relentless and fluid -and, yes, beautiful - attack eventually yielded an opening for the Swiss counter.  It was a bit ugly, but it worked.  Not so much for the North Koreans.  The Brazilians - with their signature beautiful play - maintained sufficient defensive presence (this, after all, has been Dunga's mantra).  Personally, i think all of the strum und drang about Brazil losing its panache is overblown.  Their interior passing and creativity are still better than any other (and that includes Spain...).  Robinho was marvelous.  In any event, it was a breakdown in the NK defense, a momentary hesitation by the goalkeeper, that opened the door for the first Brazilian score.  NK turned out not to be as invincible as they had hoped.

Here's one last thought.  For all of the talk about Brazilian defense, they maintained a relentless attack against NK.  Granted, they were the clearly superior team in all facets of the game, so, as Sun Tzu would say, an attacking posture was certainly appropriate.  But let's see what happens as we get further into the tournament and Brazil faces tougher teams, such as  Portugal.  It could be that Dunga is trying to get into the head of the adversary; make them think that Brazil will be hanging back, emphasizing defense.  This could encourage the Portuguese to come forward, creating certain vulnerabilities, that can be quickly exploited by the powerful Brazilian attack.  Perhaps Dunga is following on of the most famous of Sun Tzu's ideas:

All warfare is based on deception. I.17

Perhaps he is trying to make the adversary believe that Brazil will be concentrating on making itself invincible as a means of inducing the other side into making themselves vulnerable....

Joga Bonito!

Obama is reading Sun Tzu, not the Tao Te Ching

I'm emerging from the end of semester craziness.  My teaching is done for the semester (save one meeting with an independent study group this afternoon - always a pleasant meeting of minds) and the big pile of grading will not drop on me until next week.  A good time to catch up on blogging...

A blog  friend sent along a link a couple of days ago (thanks Alan!) to a post by Andrew Sullivan: "The Tao of Obama: No Fight, No Blame."  It's a simple post, just showing a photo of Obama and his new Supreme Court nominee, Elena Kagan, with the text of passage 8 from the Tao Te Ching, taken from the Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English translation:

The highest good is like water. Water gives life to the ten thousand things and does not strive. It flows in places men reject and so is like the Tao. In dwelling, be close to the land. In meditation, go deep in the heart. In dealing with others, be gentle and kind. In speech, be true. In ruling, be just. In business, be competent. In action, watch the timing. No fight: No blame.

Not really sure why he chose this translation, but it gets the job done (an interesting comparison of this and other translations of this passage can be found here).

The point, it seems, is to suggest that, in choosing Kagan, and her relatively nondescript public face (not much in the way of scholarly writings, no judicial decisions, etc.), Obama is shrewdly avoiding fights in a manner that will both succeed in the longer term and insulate him from criticism. 

And maybe all that is true.  But is it Taoist?  I think not.

I am already on record as suggesting that Obama has something of a Mencian streak (with the obvious caveat that Mencius would probably not have increased US military action in Afghanistan).  And I have recognized some Taoist resonances in his actions.  But the Kagan appointment is too strategic a political calculation to be Taoist in any meaningful sense.

Taoism encourages a minimalist approach to politics, something that, at the outset, makes it hard to apply to a position like President of the United States.  Could any President (besides maybe Calvin Coolidge) detach himself from the political sphere and do nothing that would run counter to the natural unfolding of things?  Not really.  And maybe that is making too much of Sullivan's juxtaposition.  But the suggestion that Obama's tactical avoidance of battle with conservative Republicans is Taoist misses other important aspects of his political stance, which strike me as more in line with Confucius/Mencius and Sun Tzu.

Obama is Confucian/Mencian in the sense that he has a vision of the Good, or "Humanity" (ren), and he is willing to use political power to move society toward that Good.  That is what the health care debate was all about; and that is what financial regulation is all about.  These are big projects with complex politics that Obama actively engages on a daily basis, as a good Confucian leader (and by that I mean Mencius himself in his constant efforts to persuade inhumane leaders to do the right thing) should do.

A Taoist would take a much more hands-off approach to all of this, something closer to contemporary libertarianism.  Might that bring about terrible social consequences?  Perhaps.  But the Taoist would accept these as a reflection of the natural unfolding of the Way of humankind, which contains both humanity and inhumanity.  Hard to see how any leader of any modern state could be anything close to a Taoist - although perhaps on specific issues a Taoist-like detachment might be maintained for a time.  Taoism can tell us something about our modern predicaments, and it can serve as a very general guide for personal decisions, but it is not all that useful (and it does not want to be "useful") as a framework for public policy.

Obama's choice of Kagan may be better understood as using Sun Tzu tactics to achieve Confucian ends.  As an accomplished politician, Obama understands strategy and tactics.  He knows he is in constant battle with those who want to defeat him politically.  No doubt he is attuned to the particular context of each battle he faces, what Sun Tzu discusses as "ground."  The ground for Supreme Court appointments is the Senate and filibuster is a possibility.  In other words, Obama is not in a position of clear political advantage in the Senate.  He has to tread carefully, not provoke the opposition, not put other aspects of his broader political strategy in jeopardy there. 

I think the "ground" of the Kagan confirmation battle comes closest to what Sun Tzu calls "key ground" or "communicating ground."  Key ground is: "equally advantageous for the enemy and me."  And communicating ground is: "equally accessible to the enemy and me." (11.4, 11.5).  Sun Tzu says: "Do not attack the enemy who occupies key ground; in communicating ground do not allow your formations to become separated." (11.12).

Don't attack frontally; keep your troops together; caution: that is what Obama is about.  He's reading Sun Tzu, not the Tao Te Ching, and Sun Tzu tells him:

He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot fight will be victorious. (3.25)

Sun Tzu on Afghanistan

Saw this cartoon this morning and thought it nailed Sun Tzu on Afghanistan: