The Useless Tree

The Strategic Implications of the AIG Take Over

  

As per my last post, I have been consumed, in the last 24 hours, with the dramatic moves in the US financial system.  The Fed's take over of AIG is simply stunning.  I think "take over" is a better characterization than "bail out" because the Fed is now in the position to call the shoots at the company and impose some of the costs on previous stock holders.  In any event, the larger question raised by all of this is: what impact will it have on the overall power of the US?

  And for that kind of question we turn to neither Confucianism nor Taoism but to that great strategic thinker, Sun Tzu.  In the first chapter of The Art of War, he mentions five elements that go into any initial assessment of strategy: moral influence ("Way"); weather; terrain; command; doctrine.  While all of these (yes, even "weather," if understood as unexpected circumstances) might have some application to the AIG thing, I don't want to invoke any of them just yet.  I'm drawn, at this point, to the opening lines of chapter two:

Generally, operations of war require one thousand fast four-horse chariots, one thousand four horse wagons covered in leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops. (2.1)

   Although this may seem rather anachronistic, in fact the main point is relevant: warfare requires certain material resources and capabilities.  If you do not have sufficient capabilities you are working from a position of strategic weakness.  Material capabilities are not ultimately determinative, as Sun suggests elsewhere: "In war, numbers alone confer no advantage.  Do not advance on sheer military power." (9.45).  But the initial balance of resources at hand fundamentally shape strategy:

Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him; When five times his strength, attack him; If double his strength, divide him; If equally matched you may engage him. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing; And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful. (3.12-17)

   So, does the US take over of AIG have any effect on its material capabilities to wage war?

   Although it is way early to be certain, I can think of two possible ways that all of what has happened in the past six months or so with the US financial system does create a strategic constraint for the US.

     1) The financial capacity to maintain the US military and support future uses of military power.  The Iraq war has been very expensive for the US.  Military operations have cost somewhere in the vicinity of US$ 650 billion.  When you add in longer term obligations, such as veterans benefits and the like, estimates range up to US$ 3 Trillion.  Let's just say it's a lot.  In the best of financial times, paying these costs would impose a burden on the US government, whether through a claim on tax receipts or adding to the national debt. These costs thus create obligations that compete with other demands for US government spending: entitlements, infrastructure, etc.  But these are not the best of financial times.  Going back to March and the Bear, Stearns deal, adding in the effects of the Fannie and Freddie take overs, and capping things now with the AIG seizure, one estimate suggests that the Fed has taken on a total of US$ 900 Billion in new obligations.  That, too, is a big number. How will the US handle both the costs of the Iraq war and absorb the costs - which still may go higher depending upon how the underlying mortgage crisis plays out - of the financial melt-down is not at all clear.  At the very least, it should give leaders pause when, in the future, they face a political-military crisis and they ask themselves "do we have the economic resources needed to support a lengthy military campaign?"  To put it in modernized Sun Tzu terms: will the US have the money necessary to build and maintain and deploy the contemporary equivalent of "one thousand fast, four-horse chariots" etc.?

    2) In the broader global political-economic strategic context, we know that a certain interdependence exists between the US and China.  Simply put, we buy their exports, and they hold our debt.  But recent events might be shifting this balance in China's favor.  As their economy develops, and their domestic consumer markets expand and they cultivate export markets in other parts of the world and they diversify, the role of the US market may decline in importance for them.  At the very least, their dependence on the US may decline relative to the US dependence on China to hold American debt.  With the exploding obligations the Fed is taking on, the US will now have to rely more than ever on foreigners buying and holding our debt.  Again, this may simply be a shift in the relative balance of dependencies (i.e. China will still need access to our markets) but it may be that we now need them more than they need us.  And that could matter in any military-strategic conflict between the US and China.  Such conflict does not need to be direct (one thinks immediately about Taiwan).  Rather, it could be played out in third party conflicts.  Can the US bring pressure to bear on China regarding Darfur or Burma or other such situations?  If they threaten to unload our debt, do we back down first?

    These are simply initial speculations.  But the financial burdens and weaknesses of the US at this point should put to rest the neo-con fantasy of the unipolar moment - it has long since passed.  The US does not stand as a global hegemon; rather it is searching, hat in hand, for anyone, anywhere to give is some money....

Sun Tzu on Georgia

Though the American media has been distracted in recent weeks with the Olympics and, now, the Democratic Convention, tensions in Georgia remain.  Yesterday, Russia formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, sparking protests from the US and Europe.  Although, given the overextension of the US military in Iraq, I do not believe that US words can be backed up with military action, there remains a possibility of a direct US-Russia conflict.  It's in times like these that I find myself wondering: What would Sun Tzu do?

  The first thing that comes to mind is Sun Tzu's notion of "ground."  In the Art of War, the first meaning of this term is, literally, the physical context and conditions surrounding a particular military contingent.  In Chapter 8, "The Nine Variables," five different sorts of ground are mentioned - low-lying ground, communicating ground, desolate ground, enclosed ground and "death ground" - each with its own potential for shaping the outcome of battle.  It is in this chapter, too, that some sage advice is proffered:

There are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground that should not be contested. (8.7)

    In chapter 10, "Terrain," Sun Tzu describes six qualities of "ground," and in Chapter  11, "The Nine Varieties of Ground," he discusses, well, nine varieties of ground.  There is overlap in these various categorizations but the main point is obvious: geo-strategic context is of the utmost importance in determining whether military action is prudent.

     In looking at Georgia, from an American perspective, it is all but impossible to conclude that a US attack or counterattack could be effective.  Russia has every advantage, tactically, logistically, and strategically.  In sorting through Sun Tzu's various points about ground, it is not clear how his analysis might translate into a contemporary, trans-oceanic situation.  But he makes a rather stark statement: "Do not attack an enemy who occupies key ground." (11.12).  "Key ground" is said to be "equally advantageous for the enemy or me to occupy," which, at first blush, does not seem to apply to Georgia, which Russia would have a very much easier time occupying.  Other connotations of "key ground" include "contestable ground" that is "strategically important."  I think what is suggested here is that once the enemy has already taken this kind of ground, he then holds what advantage it confers.  Trying to win back this specific ground would raise the costs and lower the chances of success for any counterattack.  And that sounds rather like Georgia, no?

     I do not want to be overly literal with Sun Tzu here.  Rather, it is his general caution that is important: careful consideration of the physical and geo-strategic qualities of a particular situation must determine the use or non-use of military force.  And it is precisely the lack of that kind of careful consideration underlying John McCain's hawkish, knee-jerk "we are all Georgians now" reaction that makes him unfit to be Commander-in-Chief.  I hope that Obama listens to his more prudent advisers to find non-military responses to the Georgia situation. 

Sun Tzu on how the Giants can win the Super Bowl

     I am back in my office at Williams in rural northwestern Massachusetts.  A far cry from the intense urban-ness of Taibei and Hong Kong.  But the great advantage of this place, for me, is that it is home.

     The interminable lay over in LA was made more pleasant by the NY Giants unexpected victory over Green Bay in the NFC conference championship.  I was perched at the bar in a Chili's restaurant, with more Packers fans in attendance than Giants supporters.  I defended New York's honor through the afternoon and was as surprised as everyone else by the outcome.

      Of course, now the problem is the apparently invincible New England Patriots.  How can the Giants possibly overcome them?  The answer can be found in that greatest of all strategists: Sun Tzu.  I will not be as brash as last year, when I predicted a Bears victory, which did not happen.  But with insights from Sun Tzu we can imagine how the Giants might be able to win.

     First, let's recognize the strategic situation:

One who has few must prepare against the enemy; one who has many makes the enemy prepare against him (6.16)

     The Giants are clearly at the disadvantage.  As the commentators on TV like to say: the Patriots have many weapons.  Their quarterback in poised and efficient; their receivers precise and fast; their running game effective.  They have much more offensive power than the questionable Giants.  And their defense has played well also.  There are few weaknesses for the Patriots, reflected in their undefeated season thus far.  So, they have "many," the Giants "few," and New York must prepare against them - i.e. we must carefully assess the full range of their power and work hard to find a winning approach.

      There are two points to keep in mind. First:

Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of of victory in the attack.

One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. (4.5,6)

     The Giants defense is obviously stronger than its offense.  They stopped the Green Bay running game on Sunday, and the Packers could not do well with screen passes.  That left short underneath pass routes, which Favre took advantage of, and the occasional longer pass.   To win against New England, the Giants must maintain their strong defense.  They cannot let themselves be distracted from their primary strengths against the run and rushing the passer.  Much will rely on the defensive line and linebackers; they are absolutely the key for the Giants.  If they do well, if they can stifle Maroney and harass Brady, they could create an opportunity for the Giants offense to control the ball and grind out a win.   The Giants must make this a defensive struggle.

      After all, the Patriots did not look good in the first half on Sunday.  Brady made mistakes.  They are not invincible; but the Giants must make themselves invincible through their defense.

      The second point is this:

To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect.  To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack. (6.7)

      I think this is especially true for the weak Giants offense, which must find ways of attacking what the Patriots do not protect.  What might that entail?  First, it will require Manning to avoid mistakes, as he has been able to do in the past couple of games.  He cannot force throws into coverage - which would be attacking precisely what the enemy is protecting.  He has to be able to look off the first or even second choices for passes and find  the safety valve.  With  an aggressive Patriots defensive line and close coverage in the secondary, screen passes and dump offs to the running backs may work well.  I just hope Jacobs can hold on to the ball when it is thrown to him.

      This will also mean that Burris must occasionally be used as a decoy to draw close coverage or double coverage.  He was brilliant on Sunday and in the Super Bowl he will have to make some big catches.  But the Patriots will be keying on him.  He will be their top priority on pass coverage.  And the Giants will have to exploit their attention there and find other receiver options.  It is critical, then, that Toomer not drop catchable balls; and the rookie Steve Smith will have to step it up.

     Finally, to attack what the Patriots do not protect will require some trick plays.  Not a lot.  But some reverses or misdirection plays will help spring the Giants offense into the open.  After all, Sun Tzu tells us that war, and football, is all about deception.

      It will certainly be difficult, but not impossible.  The Giants remind me of the 2001 Baltimore Ravens, who won the Super Bowl against the Giants that year.  They won on defense and turn overs with a weak quarterback who did not make any big mistakes.  That's what the Giants need this year.

Is the US "Surge" in Iraq Working? Sun Tzu would not be impressed

     A few days ago a reader named Jeff, who has a Sun Tzu site, suggests that the US "surge" in Iraq is working. Is it?

     At one level, the increase in US troops in recent months seems to correlate with a reduction is violence.  We have seen various reports that the streets of Baghdad seem quieter and fewer people are being killed.  That sounds great. 

     But Sun Tzu would ask us what the reduction in violence means for our ultimate goal in Iraq.  "Victory, " whatever that might mean in particular circumstances, is the whole point, after all.

      The stated goal of the surge, the purpose it was supposed to serve, is to provide breathing space for political reconciliation.  As with any war, the surge is not simply a military exercise; it aims at a political goal, and the violence can be justified only in relation to a political goal.  In these terms it is not at all clear, at this point, that the surge has "worked."

      A big front pager in the NYT  on Sunday delved into this question:

The Americans are haunted by the possibility that Iraq could go the way of Afghanistan, where Americans initially bought the loyalty of tribal leaders only to have some of them gravitate back to the Taliban when the money stopped.

 The problem, of course, is that the US has been arming Sunni groups to fight against al Qaeda in Iraq, or whatever name that strain of the insurgency is using these days, but these Sunni groups are still very much at odds with the dominant Shiite forces which are central to state power.  And the Kurds are still looking out for their own sovereign interests.  We may, therefore, be buying time for a larger clash in the future. 

      Fred Kaplan took up this topic on Christmas eve.  He reminds us of what everyone knows: the US will have to start drawing troops down in the next few months as tours of duty expire and there is no political will to press more soldiers into this deadly service.  The various factions in Iraq know that the military dynamic is moving toward a reduction in US forces, and they may well be biding their time to take advantage of whatever the situation might be as the new year unfolds.  We will know better what the "surge" accomplished a year or two from now.

      There is another possibility as well.  Everybody also knows that next year is a US presidential election year.  If anyone wants to create a political message out of the violence in Iraq - and that is what fourth generation warfare is all about - they will have a bigger media stage as the presidential race heats up.  This could play either way: with those who have an interest in the US staying or with those who have an interest in the US remaining.  Politics is the determining the ebb and flow of military action.

     The political situation in Iraq is still dire.  The surge has not changed that.  And as long as that is true, Sun Tzu would question not only the tactical achievements of the surge but, more importantly, the strategic rationale of the entire Iraq war.

CIA Lying - What Would Sun Tzu Do?

    Rather unsurprisingly, it has now been revealed that the CIA lied and broke the law (by disobeying  a court order to produce "documentary evidence") to cover up its use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: torture).  So, now we will be treated to a parade of justifications (rationalizations?) of lying during wartime: we had to it because al-Qaeda is uniquely evil and wants to kill us, etc.  And that, for me at least, brings up the greatest military strategic thinker of all time, Sun Tzu.  What might he say about this situation?

    Long story short: he would be disgusted.

     The first thing that comes to mind is that Sun Tzu would accept the general necessity of lying in wartime.  After all, one of the most famous of his sayings is that "all warfare is based on deception" (1.17, 7.12).  Now, an objection could be raised here that he means this in relation to the enemy: deception should be used to fool your adversary in ways that promote your victory.  The CIA, by contrast, is deceiving us, the people it is supposedly fighting for, which may not be what Sun Tzu has in mind. 

    But Sun Tzu does embrace the idea of limiting the flow of information, even among one's own people.  The wise commander: "...should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans." (11.43)  This suggests that certain operational details should not circulate even to officers.  In order for this to apply to torturing captives, however, it would have to be asserted that gaining information from them (even though torture is a bad way of getting good, actionable information) is compelled by the same sort of critical immediacy as actual battlefield conditions.  I am sure the CIA will make this sort of claim.

    At the very least, then, there are ideas in Sun Tzu that can be invoked to defend the CIA's lying.

     But, on balance, I believe that a more comprehensive consideration of Sun Tzu would support a condemnation of CIA lying.  There are three reasons:

    1) We should not be torturing captives to begin with - and so the lying to cover up the torture is simply covering up a bad practice.  Sun Tzu tells us: "Treat captives well, and care for them." (2.19).  To which the commentator Chang Yu adds: "All soldiers taken must be cared for with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us."  Torture defenders might counter that the war on terrorism is not like a conventional war.  The enemy is implacable and religiously determined to destroy us forever, which requires torture.  To this the faithful interpreter of Sun Tzu would partially agree but continue to more basically disagree.  The point of agreement would be the recognition that the war on terror may well be unique - but it is precisely because its particularity, and its political context, that torture must be avoided.  Which brings us to the next two points.

    2)  The ground.  Throughout much of his book Sun Tzu talks about terrain, the ground, and the necessity of fitting specific military moves to the physical environment.  I have always understood this both literally and metaphorically.  The actual physical terrain of the battlefield obviously matters, but so does the broader political and strategic context.  The war on terror is very much a political battle - fourth generation warfare.  And what this kind of struggle requires is a heightened sense of the political effects of the use of violence.  It is not just about blowing up buildings or disarming specific enemy military forces.  It is also very much about communicating specific political messages through violence.  This is something Sun Tzu understood - and why he believed you could win the war without fighting a battle. 

     When you torture, you must assume that the fact of that torture will become public information, it will become one of the images and messages you are producing and circulating.  And that message is obviously harmful to the broader political goals of the war.  Beyond its obviously abhorrent quality, torture hurts the US strategically.  Torturing and then lying about it, in big and obvious ways that shout to the world that the US tortures and lies about it, only compounds the problem.

      Thus, while Sun Tzu can support certain kinds of lying in warfare, he would most certainly reject lying about torture in the manner of the CIA today.

    3)  The final reason for a Sun Tzu rejection of the CIA practice of torture and its public lying about it is the Tao.   One of the the most fundamental factors necessary for victory he says is "Tao," which Griffith translates as "moral influence."  He goes on: "By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril." (1.4).  In a modern democratic republic, which the US is supposed to be, torture undermines the moral influence of the government.  Nothing demonstrates this better than Bush and his loss of popularity (I would even say legitimacy).  He is a laughing stock, a shame, an embarrassment.  Many Americans feel that way.  He lies and we can see it.  He has validated practices that fundamentally contradict the most basic principles of our government and society.  He has lost his moral influence and, through him, the US has lost its moral influence in the world.  All of which hurts the US strategically. 

      Bottom line: Sun Tzu would say don't torture and don't lie about it.

      And, by the way, Bush lost the war.

Ignoring Sun Tzu, Again

    My friend, Abu Aardvark, has an excellent post on the problems of the Iraq war.  The bottom line:

Tactics working against strategy - that's been the concern I've been expressing for many months now. I haven't been reassured.  Instead of getting sucked into debates over body counts, or clutching at whatever good or bad news crosses the headlines each morning, the national debate should be looking at the big picture.  It isn't about how we are doing day to day - what are we trying to achieve?

     All of the talk about the apparent decrease in violence in parts of the country, which Bush supporters tout as evidence that the "surge" is working, are largely meaningless in the larger scheme of things.  Tactical moves only make sense if they are coordinated and focused on strategic ends - and that is what is missing in the American war: it is not clear what the ultimate goal is or should be.  The tired recitation of a unified, democratic Iraq is simply impossible.  At some level everyone knows this.  But US tactics, as Marc shows, are actively pushing against this.  We are, in effect, producing a fragmentation of sovereignty (if such a weighty word can be used here) and authority.  But is that what the US really wants?  To get all realist about it: how does a collection of warlord satraps serve US interests?

      And that is where Sun Tzu comes in.  Remember what he has to say about war-fighting:

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy;

Next best is to disrupt his alliances;

The next best is to attack his army.

The worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities only when there is no alternative. (chapter 3)

      He is urging us not only to think strategically but to think in a strategically contextual manner, shaping our goals in relation to the enemy's goals.  This requires both a clear sense of what our goals should be (which is what is missing from US policy now) and an understanding of what our adversary's goals are.  In Iraq this is made much more complex by the multiplicity of adversaries: there are many and each has its own particular interests.  Of course, the real problem has been the lack of clear US strategy up until this point, a failure that has produced the current strategic complexity.  Now, it is likely too late.  Whatever we do, one or another adversary will benefit.  The game is too complicated for us to account for and attack the strategies of all of the "enemies".   All that Bush and company does is fulminate against the most likely strategic winner, whose victory his failed policy has produced: Iran.

     Bush's war is mired in worst and near-worst Sun Tzu conditions: attacking cities and armies.  The US has lost the chance to effectively attack the enemies' strategies or alliances.

      Bush lost the war.

Sun Tzu and "The War"

     As I mentioned previously, I watched most of the PBS documentary series, "The War," which presented the US experience in WWII.  One of the things that stuck me about that experience was the tenacity of the American soldiers.  Time and time again, they were placed in extraordinarily dangerous and difficult circumstances.  Casualties and deaths were, in some battles, horribly great in number.  But they fought; they rarely backed down; they died but continually pushed forward.

     It is common to hear that soldiers in such conditions find their valor in fighting for one another.  The big causes and goals that might surround a war evaporate in the heat of battle, and a man fights to survive, and to help the man next to him survive.  War, ultimately, is personal; it is about immediate relationships - a small group of buddies - and the desperate struggle to preserve those bonds.  Sun Tzu understood this:

Throw troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee.  For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve?  Then officers and men together put forth their utmost efforts.  In a desperate situation, they fear nothing; when there is no way out they stand firm.  Deep in hostile land they are bound together, and there, where there is no alternative, they will engage the enemy in hand to hand combat. (11.33)

     Sounds like Peleliu or Okinawa. 

Sun Tzu does Survivor: China

    My friend and former student Kim, who blogs at The Small Pond (and is especially good these days on Hawaiian politics), commented on another post that Sun Tzu has popped up on the US TV show, "Survivor: China."  She blogs it here. 

    So, can Sun Tzu be adapted to reality TV?  Sure, why not?  He gets adapted to just about everything else.  To the extent that the game is a competition, the strategic insights of the Art of War can apply there as well as anywhere.  When I taught the book in a class last January, one student wrote a paper that applied it to dating!

    I don't know much about the whole Survivor thing, but I imagine that one aspect of it would make for a somewhat complex application of Sun Tzu: ultimately, Survivor is a Hobbesian context, a "war" of all against all, as each contestant looks out primarily for his or her self-interest.  Alliances and teams are, therefore, very transitory.   A strategic decision that assumes that a certain individual is with you might turn out to be costly if and when that person turns against you.  This is not quite the circumstance that Sun Tzu was assuming (he was dealing with relatively stable military organizations: he knew who was on his side and who, generally, was against him.  His own soldiers were not likely to turn on him).  This would make the "ground" aspect of the book especially important - i.e. being constantly aware of immediate surroundings and conditions.

     While I would like to avoid the orientalist "exotic China" thing, I can imagine the immediate relevance of Sun Tzu to reality TV:

      - war is all about deception;

     - the most effective engagement is the one that is not fought (i.e. the initial deployment and shape of one's "force" is sufficient to deter or scare off the enemy).

      - the best strategy is to attach the other's strategy.

      - use spies.

      - be meticulous in planning and preparation.

      - know that there are some battles that should not be fought.

     I'm not going to watch (I never have been interested in the whole reality TV thing, except how it has moved to China in ways that apparently scare the government there), so someone out there can tell  me if Sun Tzu is more than just a ornament in this case.

Sun Tzu on the Failure of the Generals

     Fred Kaplan has an article in yesterday's NYT Sunday Magazine, "Challenging the Generals," which follows up on the critique of US military leadership in Iraq put forward by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling. 

     The problem, it seems to me, is a failure of strategic vision.   Or, alternatively, a failure of creativity in linking tactics to strategy.  All of which is exacerbated by a failure of responsibility.  The war in Iraq has obviously gone badly for the US, especially from a strategic point of view.  But virtually no one has been held accountable, no one has been demoted or lost their job for the strategic flaws of US military operations.  In fact, the people who have been punished, and I am thinking especially of General Shinseki, are the ones who had the correct analysis at the outset.

      And this brings me to Sun Tzu.  He has much to say about military leadership, but I offer here a few points that seem especially relevant in light of Kaplan's and Yingling's arguments.

      At the very start of The Art of War, Sun Tzu identifies "command" as one of the five "fundamental factors:"

By command I mean the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness. (1.7)

      Which is then explicated by the commentator Tu Mu:

...If wise, a commander is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expediently.  If sincere, his men will have no doubt of the certainty of rewards and punishments.  If humane, he loves mankind, sympathizes with others, and appreciates their industry and toil.  If courageous, he gains victory by seizing opportunity without hesitation.  If strict, his troops are disciplined because they are in awe of him and afraid of punishment.

     The American inability to adapt flexibly to the changing battlefield of Iraq suggests failures of, in Sun Tzu's terms, wisdom and courage.  The latter might seem a bit harsh - there are certainly many acts of individual courage performed everyday by American military people in Iraq.  But Sun Tzu here seems to be invoking another sort of courage, the courage to act quickly in the face of changing circumstances, something that the bureaucratic behemoth that is the US military seems unable to do.  As Kaplan suggest, perhaps more courage could also be demonstrated by general officers in telling political leaders the truth, especially about the real numbers of troops it would take to occupy Iraq or the real effects the war is having on US military power more generally.

      Also, Kaplan's reporting, which suggests a growing lack of trust on the part of junior officers toward senior officers, points to a failure of what Sun Tzu calls sincerity.  Because they cannot be assured of their futures in the military, talented junior officers, Kaplan says, are opting out:

West Point cadets are obligated to stay in the Army for five years after graduating. In a typical year, about a quarter to a third of them decide not to sign on for another term. In 2003, when the class of 1998 faced that decision, only 18 percent quit the force: memories of 9/11 were still vivid; the war in Afghanistan seemed a success; and war in Iraq was under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. But last year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the service’s highest loss rate in three decades.

       This situation might reflect the failure of senior officers, the generals, to listen to and learn from the experiences of the junior officers.  Instead of adapting themselves to evolving circumstances, they are forcing the juniors to conform to their wishes, which pushes against this advice from Sun Tzu:

Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates. (5.21)

     To which the commentator Ch'en Hao adds:

Experts in war depend especially on opportunity and expediency.  They do not place the burden of accomplishment on their men alone.

         And just in case we have missed this important point, Sun Tzu reminds us again:

He [the general] changes his methods and alters his plans so that people have no knowledge of what he is doing. (11.45)

     That seems to be the underlying problem: the generals are just out of touch and too slow to change.  Maybe they should get back to reading their copies of Sun Tzu!

Political Leadership and the Iraq War: Clausewitz 1, Sun Tzu O

     I learn a lot from Sun Tzu and I believe he has some important things to say to us today, across all the centuries from his own time.  But  his notions about the relationship between political and military leadership in war just do not fit the current situation in Iraq.  Clausewitz, I think, is more helpful on this point.

    Sun Tzu says (sorry, don't have my text here with me at home just now for exact quotes) that once war has begun, the generals must be given absolute command authority to get the dirty work done quickly.  Political leaders should stay clear and let the military men do their jobs.  This sounds rather like the line that Bush is taking these days, telling us that he cannot countenance pulling troops out, or even begin to think about pulling troops out, because he is simply following the advice of his military commanders.   (This is, of course, a canard since he has already relieved those military commanders who disagreed with him...).  But what will military commanders say when they are confronted with the most recent attacks in Kirkuk?

A suicide bomber in the volatile northern city of Kirkuk on Monday crashed his truck into a compound that includes offices of a major Kurdish political party, killing 85 people. Many victims were women and children, shopping in the busy market next to the political offices, who were engulfed by a large fireball.

Hours later, the Iraqi authorities said, men wearing Iraqi military uniforms stormed into a village in Diyala Province and killed 29 men, women and children. An Iraqi security official, Col. Ragheb Radhi al-Umiri, said the gunmen surrounded the victims and fired into the crowd. The attack occurred in a remote village north of Baquba, he said, and the bodies of some victims were “desecrated” before the attackers fled.

 Horrible stuff.  But these attacks pose a larger strategic issue:

The Kirkuk attack was the latest to stoke fears that intensified American military operations in Baghdad may have led insurgents to move their operations to locations that can more easily be attacked.

 On the face of it, if you view this as a military problem the answer seems clear: maintain US troop levels in Baghdad but bring in more forces to counter the shifting form of the enemy.  More troops.  And that is what US commanders are hinting at.  It's understandable because their job is to consider the problem from strictly - or, narrowly - a military point of view.  The only problem is, and this is a massive problem, virtually all modern wars, this one included, are never simply military problems; they are embedded in the suffused by political dynamics.

      That is a point I have always associated with Clausewitz.  I know, the usual line - "war is politics by other means" - is hackneyed and open to a variety of interpretations.  But the general message of his analysis, the desire to avoid "extreme war," at least implicitly reminds us of the political context and limitations to war.  Generals cannot be left alone to carry out the war, not at the strategic level at least, because they are bound to make political mistakes in their pursuit of military solutions.  Their battlefield autonomy needs to be bounded by very specific circumstances of battle. 

        At this point the larger question of whether the US should keep troops in Iraq cannot be driven by the simple military logic of "defeating the enemy."  "Victory" or "defeat" are now obviously matters of political outcomes, and those can be made more difficult by military actions, as evidenced by the difficulties of opium eradication in Afghanistan (Remember Afghanistan?  The war the US opted out of in order to invade Iraq.  A war that has now heated up again, much to our disadvantage...)

      So, on the question of how much autonomy military commanders should have to determine the broad strategic dynamics of war, and how much responsibility civilian political leaders must bear, I go with Clausewitz over Sun Tzu.

     Now, if we could only get Bush to understand this notion of responsibility....